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The development of technology and the way of doing business exchange sensitive information all 
over the world through IT resources. In consequence of such reality, cyber events are more likely to 
occur, being the banking sector one of the major targets. However, in parallel with these new perils 
from technological growth, awareness of cyber risk is also increasing among institutions, as well as 
the search for protection and measures to fight them. Cyber insurance is one of the possible 
protection options. 
The main goal of this work is to assess the supply of cyber insurance among the banking sector 
operating in Portugal. As empirical investigations of cyber insurance applied in the country are rarely 
reported in the literature, the results are novel. 
In order to get the main goal, the research is based on a literature review where will be presented 
the “state of the art” of cyber insurance market in the world and in the country. In addition, an 
empirical study will be made through the application of questionnaires to ascertain the specificities 
of cyber insurance suppliers or potential suppliers in the Portuguese market, their perception of 
market evolution and knowledge about cyber risk. There is also a specific questionnaire for the 
supervisor entity in order to know its point of view about the topic in discussion. 
The main conclusions of this study relate to the fact that there is still a long way to go in the 
Portuguese insurance sector for cyber risk. The sector in the country started to be developed by 
international companies and only after that the national ones started to have more awareness on the 
subject, as mentioned by the Autoridade de Supervisão de Seguros e Fundos de Pensões (ASF). 
However, awareness of the issue is not the only point that leads to the underdevelopment of this 
specific insurance. The difficulties in the product underwriting process, which on the part of those 
who sell as well as those who buy, the high and variable prices, the lack of historical data and the 
information asymmetries are examples of obstacles that still have to be overcome. 
Although the cyber risk insurance sector is taking its first steps, it is believed to have a large margin of 
expansion, as has already been the case in several other countries. The creation of information 
sharing platforms on cyber incidents and the design of insurance and reinsurance products for cyber 
incidents are considered by the participant insurers as the main measures to be taken to assist this 
market development. It therefore becomes an inevitable topic to be addressed by the insurance 
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Cyberspace and the internet have revolutionized the way of communication and do business. They 
enabled to expand interconnectivity as well provided several benefits for knowledge-based 
economies, allowing businesses to operate globally with greater speed and efficiency. But where 
there is a great opportunity, there are also risks associated with it (IRM, 2014). The rapid pace of 
technological change, increasing connectivity through the Internet of Things1 (IoT) and the growing 
sophistication of cyber-attackers introduce new vulnerabilities and increase the potential for 
systemic and risk aggregation complexities (Camillo, 2017). 
Approaches to cyber risk are maturing as organizations recognize it as an enterprise business risk and 
not just an information technology (IT) problem (Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018). There is also the 
acknowledgment that cyber risk cannot be completely eradicated from business because of its many 
correlations and specificities. The best that can be done is to be managed to facilitate the success of 
a company’s drive forward (RSA, 2016).  
Several possibilities to manage this risk have emerged along with the decision-maker awareness and 
understanding to it.  Cyber insurance is one of the possibilities that was created to address risk that 
cannot be reasonably mitigated by IT security measures and because of the realization that current 
insurance policies may not adequately cover cyber risks (Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, 2014). 
Also, in the area of supervision and regulation cyber risk is a growing concern. The European Union 
(EU) has made several efforts to harmonize rules and procedures through legislation and 
recommendations that aim to help organizations to protect themselves and be more aware of this 
new kind of threat.   
Faced with the new perils, financial institutions like banks and insurers see in the need to rethink 
strategies in order to adapt to the new challenges imposed by technological innovation. Banking 
institutions (representing the demand side for the purpose of this work) need to find out how to 
manage these new risks and find the most efficient way to invest in security without losing 
profitability. This raises questions inside those institutions like are they sufficiently aware for cyber-
attacks? Should the organization self-insure their exposure to cyber risk or should they buy 
insurance? How much they are willing to invest to transfer their exposure? What are the risks they 
expect to cover with insurance? On the other hand, insurance companies (representing the supply 
side) need to adjust to the new reality of threats and offer insurance that delivers what their 
customers need in terms of cyber perils but at the same time not jeopardizing their ability to accept 
risk. This arises questions like how much the company are willing to accept to take costumer’s risk? 
What covers they are expecting that costumers will seek for? What cover limits the company 
impose? What requisites the company demand costumers to have in order to offer a cyber insurance 
product?  
 
1 There is no common definition for IoT. A definition proposed by The International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) for instance defines it as ‘‘a global infrastructure for the Information Society, enabling advanced services 
by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on, existing and evolving, interoperable information and 
communication technologies’’ (Fluchter & Wortmann, 2015). 
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The main goal of this work is to assess the supply of cyber insurance among the banking sector 
operating in Portugal. As empirical investigations of cyber insurance applied in the country are rarely 
reported in the literature, the results are new. 
The research is based on a literature review where will be presented the “state of the art” of cyber 
insurance market in the world. In addition, an empirical study will be made through the application 
of online questionnaires to ascertain the specificities of the market’s supply side players constituted 
by insurance companies working in Portugal. In addition, it will also be explored the Portuguese 
insurer's supervisor, Autoridade de Supervisão de Seguros e Fundos de Pensões (ASF), view about the 
offer of an insurance against cyber risk for banking sector in the country. 
 In order to do that this work is be divided in six main chapters. Chapter 2 presents the study 
relevance where it is characterized the cyber risk around the world and in Portugal, explained the 
reason why it is a great concern and the main consequences of a cyber-attack. Chapter 3 describes 
the main goal of this work and the specific objectives to reach the key objective. The most extensive 
part of this work is disclosed in chapter 4. It is a literature review talking about cyber risk, cyber 
insurance, cybersecurity in banking sector and a quick overview about legislation. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
are the most practical ones. They describe the methodology applied, the results, discussion and main 
conclusions that resulted from the empirical investigation. 
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2. STUDY RELEVANCE 
2.1. BACKGROUND 
Electronic media is replacing the traditional approach of file and paper systems, so having 
information online for almost all the activities is the new trend emerging in world, which require high 
level of network availability and consequently high-level of system security (Saini, Azad, Raut, & 
Hadimani, 2011). Emerging technology such as Fintech2 is an example of that. It is a new way of doing 
business that replaces bureaucracy and time-consuming processes by online procedures much faster 
and easier to get. Although technology innovations allow a wide range of possibilities for human 
progress, it also increases the vulnerability to cyber incidents once it expands the number of entry 
points into institutions, which hackers could target (IMF & Bouveret, 2018).  
In short, as stated by Deloitte Advisory Cyber Risk Services in the RSA paper (“Cyber Risk Appetite: 
Defining and Understanding Risk in the Modern Enterprise.”), “the fundamental things that 
organizations undertake in order to drive performance and execute on their business strategies 
happen to also be the things that actually create cyber risk. This includes globalization, mergers and 
acquisitions, extension of third-party networks and relationships, outsourcing, adoption of new 
technologies, movement to the cloud, or mobility” (RSA, 2016). 
According several sources, through their researches and forums, the cyber risk is increasingly 
considered relevant and a concern. Technological risks, in the form of data fraud, cybersecurity 
incidents or infrastructure breakdown, were identified as among the top ten risks facing the global 
economy and the fourth largest risk among surveyed insurers by the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS, 2016). A year later, in the eighth Emerging Risks Survey by the Society of 
Actuaries, cyber risk was considered the greatest emerging risk (Xu, Hua, & ASA, 2017). Reaching the 
same conclusion, in the World Economic Forums3 of 2012, 2014, 2017, 2018 and 2019, cyber-attacks 
were considered in the top 5 global risks in terms of likelihood. Additionally, a survey of the major 
risks to financial stability done by IMF verified that cyber risk was considered, in the past years of 
2016 and 201, the greatest peril to stability among other risks like geopolitical, impact of new 




2 FinTech Action plan: For a more competitive and innovative European financial sector. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180308-action-plan-fintech_en.pdf 




Source: IMF, & Bouveret, A. (2018). Cyber Risk for the Financial Sector: A Framework for Quantitative 
Assessment. DTCC Systemic Risk barometer 2017Q1 
Figure 2.1 Risk to broader economy 
Cyber risk is transversal to all sectors of activity once all of them depend on IT resources and rely on 
customer’s data to conduct business. Figure 2.2 shows an example of the awareness of cyber risk 
across several business sectors in the U.S. being the financial, insurance and real state sectors the 
most conscious (IMF & Bouveret, 2018). 
 
 
Source: IMF, & Bouveret, A. (2018). Cyber Risk for the Financial Sector: A Framework for Quantitative 
Assessment.. SEC form 10-K; and staff calculations 
Figure 2.2 Cyber risk awareness by sector in the U.S. 
In parallel to the rising awareness of cyber events, the penetration of cyber insurance is also 
increasing, representing one of the fastest growing sectors of the insurance industry, according to 
AIR 2017 estimates (AIR, 2017). 
More specifically, following the beginning of year 2000, the dotcom crash and the September 11 
attacks, interest in cyber insurance grew as there was a growing realization that the virtual world did 
not necessarily fit within the scope of many traditional covers/classes of insurance (Camillo, 2017).  
According to European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), sectors typically buying 
cyber insurance include retailers, healthcare providers, hotels and financial services (ENISA, 2012). 
Noting the same, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) presented in its 
study of 2017, “Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management”, collected data from 
Marsh reports where they estimated the rates of acquisition of cyber insurance by sector, based on 
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its client’s information (mostly US clients) (OECD, 2017).  Figure 2.3 shows these take up rates by 










Source: OECD. (2017). Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management. 
Figure 2.3. Estimated stand-alone cyber-insurance take-up rates by sector 
According to OECD, the stand-alone cyber insurance market reached an estimated 3,5 billion dollars 
in written premiums in 2016, of which approximately 3 billion dollars was written on behalf of US-
based companies and 300 million dollars was written on behalf of European companies (OECD, 
2017). Additionally, it is expected that the market continues to grow in Europe mostly due to the 
implementation of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which will create uniform 
notification and disclosure requirements.  
Insurance industry forecasts predict an expected growth in cyber premiums from around 2 billion 
dollars in 2015 to some 20 billion dollars or more by 2025, as stated in the study of Woods & 
Simpson, “Policy measures and cyber insurance: a framework. Journal of Cyber Policy” (Woods & 
Simpson, 2017).  
 
2.2. MAIN CONSEQUENCES OF CYBER RISK 
An interesting approach to interpret the frequency and severity of cyber-attacks is the one 
developed by Delloite in its research “Beneath the surface of a cyberattack”, in 2016. It allocates the 
different consequences of cyber-attacks along the length of an iceberg (Deloitte, 2016).  
At the top of the iceberg, and thus surfaced, are those direct consequences of a cyber-attack. They 
are those that are felt immediately or that impact in short term the normal functioning of the 
institutions and the integrity and confidentiality of the information. Those have the better-known 
cyber incident costs like technical investigation, customer breach notification, post-breach customer 
protection, regulatory compliance, public relations, attorney fees and litigation and cybersecurity 
improvements.  
Beneath the surface will be the hidden or less visible consequences of cyber-attacks. Those may only 
be known several years after the attack. They are insurance premium increases, increased cost to 
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raise debt, impact of operational disruption or destruction, lost value of customer relationships, 
value of lost contract revenue, devaluation of trade name and loss of intellectual property. These 
costs/consequences are explained in more detail in annex 1. 
 
In fact, there are many ways a cyber-attack can affect an organization, and the impacts will vary 
depending on the nature, severity of the attack and the time of action after identifying it. According 
to a study of Camillo, “Cyber risk and the changing role of insurance” in 2017, it was found that in 
34% of the cases investigated it took days to discover an insider attack, followed by 22% of the cases 
that took weeks and 18% took hours, as can be shown in figure 2.4. 
 
Source: Camillo, M. (2017). Cyber risk and the changing role of insurance. Journal of Cyber Policy. 
Figure 2.4. Insider attack discovery time 
 
There is more awareness that the first 48 hours following detection of a breach are a critical window 
of opportunity to contain a crisis, according to Camillo, 2017. Additionally, a further 45 days following 
discovery of a breach is needed on average for recovery and mitigation. Therefore, it can take up to 
seven months between the initiation of an attack and recovery from it, with some breaches taking a 
year or more to resolve (Camillo, 2017).  
So, there are just a few consequences that stay “at the iceberg’s surface”. Most of them remain 
submerged, which is why it is so difficult to predict the real impacts of a cyber-attack. 
 
2.3. REAL LIFE EXAMPLES 
In the past years there was a realization that companies could no longer hope to simply avoid cyber-
attacks through IT security. Several cyber incidents demonstrated that even organizations with 
robust risk mitigation and security measures were not immune.  
Historical data prove that no matter the size of the company or the sector that it operates, cyber-
attacks are a real threat to everyone. 
Annex 2 shows examples of that. Many companies among the most variate sectors, like health, 
telecommunications, food, energy and business sector suffered from cyber-attacks in the past years.  
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Additionally, annex 3 shows several cyber incidents affecting the banking sector. According to Banco 
the Portugal, the institutions of financial sector concentrated more than 25% of all the malicious 
cyber-attacks in 2018 (Banco de Portugal, 2019). 
It should be noted that the information collected represent a very small sample of what cyber-
attacks have been over the years. The more exhaustive the search, the more historical records will be 
found in the years before, during and after the dates presented.  
Cyber threats are the new risks of the modern world and it is likely that continue to rise along years 
as cyber-attackers are becoming more sophisticated and innovations are in constantly development.  
 
2.4. CYBER RISK IN PORTUGAL 
Cybercrime threatens Portuguese and global companies. This is a risk in which there is still relatively 
little experience in Portugal (and even in Europe). However, several studies are being developed.  
Lloyd's Iberia find out in its investigation that the immediate exposure of Lisbon economy to a 
catastrophic risk involving natural phenomena, human action (the case of a cyber-attack) or even a 
humanitarian crisis is in the order of 1040 million dollars. Of this amount, about 840 million dollars 
will be human responsibility and the rest will be natural risks. Additionally, they revealed that the five 
biggest risks that Lisbon faces are the market crash that could involve 550 million dollars; floods with 
an impact on the city's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around 100 million dollars; while a cyber-
attack will cost the city 80 million dollars’ worth of city's GDP  (Bernardo, 2018). 
Additionally, the research carried out by Marsh in 2018, "The Portuguese companies' vision of Risk 
2016, 2017, 2018", in which 170 Portuguese companies participated, regarding the risks that 
Portuguese companies considered they could face in 2018, pointed that cyber-attacks were 
identified as the main risk (with 57%) being at the forefront of risks such as political or social 
instability and extreme weather events. In 2017 this statistic was only 36%, occupying the second 
place in the top 5 and in 2016 had only 25% (Marsh, 2018). 
According to MDS’s presentation entitled “Cyber Risk. Ameaça virtual versus ameaça real”, of June 
2019, Portugal is the sixth country in the world with the highest number of computers infected by 




3. STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The main goal of this work is to assess the supply of insurance against cyber risk in the banking sector 
operating in Portugal. 
In order to meet the main goal, there are specific objectives important to be addressed such as 
characterize the knowledge of insurance sector companies on the cyber risk; characterize the 
perception of the sector on the main exposures and impacts of cyber risk in banking institutions; 
check the determining factors for the supply to offer cyber insurance as a mean of protection against 
the risk; characterize the perception of insurance sector companies on the evolution of the cyber 
insurance market and finally, characterize the perception of supervisor authority on the cyber 





4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1. CYBER RISK 
4.1.1. Overview on Cyber Risk 
There is no standardized definition for cyber risk. Regulators of insurance and financial markets 
follow the operational risk frameworks stated in Basel II and Solvency II to categorize cyber risk. They 
define it as an "operational risk to information and technology assets that have consequences 
affecting the confidentiality, availability or integrity of information or information systems” and 
categorize it into four classes: actions of people, systems and technology failures, failed internal 
processes and external events (Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, 2014).  
The definition adopted by the European Banking sector goes along to that defined by Basel II. They 
define a security risk as “the risk resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes or external 
events that have or may have an adverse impact on the availability, integrity, confidentiality of 
information and communication technology (ICT) systems and/or information used for the provision 
of payment services. This includes risk from cyber-attacks or inadequate physical security” (EBA, 
2017). 
Another two possible definitions are summarized in the issuer paper written by International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), “Issues Paper on Cyber Risk”. One arose during a CRO 
Forum where it was broadly described as “any risks that emanate from the use of electronic data and 
its transmission, including technology tools such as the internet and telecommunications networks. It 
also encompasses physical damage that can be caused by cybersecurity incidents, fraud committed 
by misuse of data, any liability arising from data storage, and the availability, integrity and 
confidentiality of electronic information − be it related to individuals, companies, or governments.” 
The other one arose from the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions that described it as “the combination of the 
probability of an event occurring within the realm of an organization’s information assets, computer 
and communication resources and the consequences of that event for an organization” (IAIS, 2016). 
Principals like confidentiality, integrity, and availability of companies’ data are therefore an essential 
part of cyber risk’s definition and prevention. In annex 4 is presented the conceptual definition of 
those principals, developed by sources like IMF4 and IRM5 in those works created in 2014 and 2018 
respectively. 
The classification of cyber risk can also depend on the context. There are two possible contexts to 
consider: the demand side (companies buying cyber insurance) and the supply side (insurance 
companies selling cyber protection).  
For buyers, cyber risk can be interpreted as an operational risk. For insurance companies, however, 
the allocation of cyber risk depends on which part of the business is considered. If it is considered 
insurance companies as providers of insurance coverage, then cyber risk is an insurance risk. If, 
 
4 IMF, & Bouveret, A. (2018). Cyber Risk for the Financial Sector: A Framework for Quantitative 
Assessment. 
5 IRM. (2014). Cyber Risk: Resources for Practitioners. 
19 
 
however, it is considered an insurer as a company that can be hacked and seeking for protection 
against cyber risk it is interpreted as operational risk (Eling & Wirfs, 2016).  
 
4.1.2. Categories and Subcategories of Cyber Risk 
In the study of Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, “Insurability of Cyber Risk: an empirical analysis” in 2015, they 
refer three criteria that an event must fulfill in order to be categorized as a cyber risk:  
1) A critical asset such as a company server or a database needs to be affected; 
2) A relevant actor needs to be involved in the cause of the cyber risk incident (e.g., 
hackers, employees, system, and nature); 
3) A relevant consequence needs to be present, such as a loss of data or misuse of 
confidential data.  
Many categories of cyber risk as well as their subcategories have already been identified in several 
studies. The Cebula and Young approach (“A Taxonomy of Operational Cyber” in 2010) is widely 
accepted and used in this kind of research work. They divided cyber risk in four main categories. They 
are actions of people, systems and technology failures, failed internal processes and external events. 
Those categories fulfill the three criteria stated above. They satisfy criteria (1) once in all of them a 
company server or a database is affected, criteria (2) once each of them has a source of cyber risk 
and criteria (3) because all categories have consequences, some more serious than others, for the 
organizations. So, all the categories and subcategories presented by Cebula and Young are 
considered as cyber risk according to the Biener, Eling, & Wirfs criterion. 
Beyond this categorization, a possible classification can be attributed to the categories and 
subcategories of cyber risk. This classification is presented by Eling & Wirfs, in their work “Cyber Risk 
- Too Big to Insure?” in 2016, where they propose a distinction between criminal or non-criminal 
sources of cyber risk. Annex 5 shows those classification and give examples to each of them. 
In annex 6, it is presented an aggregation of the main categories and subcategories of the cyber risk 
proposed by Cebula and Young with the classification presented by Eling & Wirfs in their study. 
The research carried out by Biener, Eling, & Wirfs verified that actions of people are considered the 
main source of cyber risk while the other categories, such as external disasters, are very rare. Mark 
Camillo, for the Journal of Cyber Policy, also reinforce that “a significant number of successful cyber 
intrusions have a human element” (Camillo, 2017). In this way, privileged users, that have access to 
an organization’s network, devices and servers, are often an organizations’ greatest security risk.  
So, there are several types of cyber incidents that fill in the categories described above. In most of 
the times it is difficult to detect the source, infer the damages and losses and find out the potential 
ways to avoid other incidents. Annex 7 present a wide list of cyber incidents. There isn´t a standard 
and static labeling of cyber risk events since the nature of this risk is very dynamic and it is in 
increasing sophistication. The intention is not to present a ‘definitive’ overview of all types of 
incidents, but simply to give an idea of the most common types. It is an aggregation of several cyber 




4.2. CYBER INSURANCE 
4.2.1. Overview on Cyber Insurance 
Several companies regardless of size and sector collect, store, and share substantial amounts of 
private and confidential information with various third parties, may they be service providers, 
intermediaries, costumers or insurers. 
The usual approach to managing information security risk is like other business risks. Ideally it is 
intended to eliminate the sources of risk, then mitigate them, absorb and, if possible, transfer.  
 Since cyber risk cannot be totally eliminated because of its dynamic and ever-changing nature, 
companies can adopt several options of risk response as: risk avoidance (for example, avoid use of 
USB flash drives); risk mitigation (control objectives and control measures like protection 
technologies (firewall, antivirus, encryption) and security procedures (passwords security, access 
control)); risk transfer (cyber risk insurance) and risk acceptance (self-insurance) (Kosub, 2015). 
There are several risk transfers options possible to an organization to adopt. They differ from each 
other by the agent that take the risk. A study developed by Martin Eling and Jan Hendrik Wirfs from 
University of St. Gallen in 2016, stated several forms of transferring risk.  It can be through a risk 
pool, insurance, reinsurance, capital markets or governments. Annex 8 shows a summary of risk 
transfer possibilities available. 
In the case of buying insurance as a transfer of risk option, an insurance contract (policy) binds an 
insurance company (supply side) in the occurrence of contractually defined loss events to pay a 
specified amount (claim) to the insurance holder (demand side). In return, the insurance holder pays 
a fixed sum (premium) to the insurance company to receive financial compensation in case of certain 
IT related adverse event occurs (Franke, 2017).  
The process of underwriting a cyber insurance is very specific from company to company. Even in the 
same industry differences may exist in the way that companies use, process or store their 
information so there are variances related to the selection of the coverage type and to the risk 
assessment phase of security and cyber protection, where the evaluation of the security systems and 
tools by IT specialist and insurer is done. That assessment can influence sometimes the amount of 
the premium that is calculated (ENISA, 2012). 
Cyber insurance seems to be a solution each more adopted by companies to transfer their risk 
exposure. According to a study done by European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) in 2018, “the increasing number of cyber incidents, the continued digital transformation and 
new regulatory initiatives in the EU are all expected to raise awareness and boost the demand for 
cyber insurance” and “the growth in the cyber insurance market is a sure sign of firms’ increasing 
awareness of cyber risk and appetite to transfer exposure”. In fact some markets are already more 
aware of this new emerging risk than others that is the case of the US market where cyber insurance 
is frequently regarded as an “hygiene factor” (Franke, 2017) meaning that it is seen as part of a 
necessary security pack that all businesses should have. 
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4.2.2. Coverages and exclusions 
Cyber insurance coverage 
As stated above, risks faced by corporations are often unique to its industry or even to the company 
itself, so most undertakings provide tailor-made solutions. Company size, size of the customer base, 
web presence, and type of data collected and stored are important determinants of cyber insurance 
policy terms and pricing (Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, 2015). 
The significant property that distinguishes cyber risk from conventional risk is that ICT resources are 
interconnected in a network, and therefore the analysis of risk and its related potential losses needs 
to take into account the network topology (Xu, Hua, & ASA, 2017). 
Cyber insurance can provide coverage for both first party and third-party liabilities. First party risks 
are the ones that directly affect the insured. Third party risk are risks that might initially affect 
someone other than the insured (first party) or insurer (second party, against which an insured like to 
have coverage (ENISA, 2016).   
In annex 9, can be seen the common coverages from first-party and third-party losses, outlined by 
EIOPA in its study “Understanding cyber insurance” of 2018. 
Additionally, cyber insurance can be offered in three different ways: 1) a stand-alone product, 2) a 
specific endorsement on existing policies (an add-on coverage to traditional lines of business) or 3) as 
part of traditional coverages without a specific endorsement (often referred to as silent cyber 
coverage that refers to cases where cyber exposure is neither explicitly included nor excluded within 
an insurance policy) (EIOPA, 2018) (OECD, 2017).  
1) Stand-alone cyber insurance policies  
The stand-alone cyber insurance market was developed in response to the introduction of exclusions 
of cyber-related losses like property, crime, kidnap and ransom. OECD has presented in its study, 
“Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management”, which exclusions may exist: (i) general 
exclusions of all losses resulting from a cyber-attack or incident; (ii) an exclusion applied in general 
liability policies to exclude liability related to data breaches; and (iii) exclusion of losses related to 
data restoration (OECD, 2017).  
The coverage provided by stand-alone cyber insurance policies can vary significantly across 
providers. The abundance of policy forms may be partly due to the common practice of offering a 
menu of possible coverage options allowing policyholders to tailor their policy terms based on their 
specific level of exposure (OECD, 2017). 
OECD presented also an overview of the possible coverage for different categories of cyber-related 
losses. This overview was based on responses to the OECD questionnaire as well as on its review of 
selected publicly available descriptions of policies from major providers (total of 23 providers based 
in 7 countries). For comparison, it also shown the results of a similar exercise undertaken by Risk 
Management Solutions, Inc. and Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies in 2016 of 26 stand-alone 





Source: OECD. (2017). Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management. 
Figure 4.1 Loss categories commonly included in stand-alone policies  
 
As the graph suggests the more commonly coverage loss categories, representing more than 50% are 
the incident response costs, regulatory and legal defense costs, fines and penalties, breach of privacy 
compensation (that represent the data confidentiality breaches); business interruption losses; 
network security failure liabilities, data and software loss,  cyber ransom and extortion losses and 
communication and media liability. 
In the case of fines and penalties, some policies will not cover it or will only provide such coverage 
where permissible by law. Another case is of cyber ransom and extortion where there is some 
variation in the types of losses covered. Some providers only cover costs related to efforts to avoid 
paying a ransom, not the payment of a ransom itself. Insurance companies may also choose not to 
provide such coverage in order to be consistent with government policies that are explicitly opposed 
to making ransom payments in response to kidnapping/extortion. 
The other categories are not so commonly covered, according to OECD data. In some cases because 
it is a challenge for insurers to quantify the possible losses and impacts and, in the case of financial 
theft and fraud, the low level of coverage may be because many traditional crime policies provide 
coverage for financial theft without any exclusion of cyber-related incidents (OECD, 2017). 
Stand-alone cyber insurance products generally include additional services such as the access to 
service providers that can assist policyholders in responding to cyber incidents and preparing 
response plans (Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018). Some insurance companies provide first response 
incident management as an integrated part of their products. These services not only help companies 
to improve their security structure but also give insurance companies a degree of control of the 
quality of incident management, making it easier to predict and manage the costs of incidents. 
However, in most cases the insurance companies do not provide this service in-house, but rather 







2) and 3) Cyber risk coverage in traditional insurance policies (endorsed and silent) 
Some insurance coverage for losses resulting from cyber incidents may be explicitly (endorsed) or 
implicitly (silent) covered in traditional policies as is the case of property, general liability, Directors 
and Officers liability, errors and omissions liability/professional indemnity, crime/fidelity, kidnap and 
ransom policies.  
As organizations assess their cyber insurance coverage options, it is important to understand how 
cyber incidents may be covered in existing policies. This is a challenge for many organizations as 
there can be overlaps or “silent coverage” for cyber incidents in existing policies (Marsh & 
McLENNAN, 2018).  
According to OECD, the most common coverages for cyber risk in traditional policies are (OECD, 
2017):  
• Property policies – data and software loss, business interruption, physical damage; 
• Liability policies – Incident response costs (compulsory investigations), regulatory and 
legal defense costs, fines and penalties, breach of privacy compensation, network 
security failure, communication and media liability, product liability, directors’ and 
officers’ liability, professional indemnity; 
• Crime/fidelity policies – financial theft and/or fraud; 
• Kidnap and ransom policies – cyber ransom and extortion. 
 
In insurance companies’ point of view there are some challenges regarding coverage. According to 
OECD there are significant losses from cyber incidents that are not usually included within the scope 
of stand-alone or traditional insurance coverage like the impacts on a company's reputation and 
future business and the loss of value of intellectual property. In both cases, the key impediment to 
coverage is the difficulty in quantifying the value of the future business that has been lost due to 
reputational damage or the reduced ability to exploit the commercial value of intellectual property 
(OECD, 2017). 
Besides that, insurers typically impose a maximum loss limit for cyber risk policies in order to protect 
themselves against unexpected amounts of exposure. This cover limits can vary between insurance 
companies and whether this amount is acceptable depends on the risk preferences and cyber risk 
exposure of the individual policyholder. An increase in coverage should be negotiable but will result 
in higher premiums.  
Another severe problem regarding cover limits is policy complexity. According to Biener, Eling, & 
Wirfs, the dynamic nature of cyber risk and the existence of several exclusions in cyber insurance 
contracts rises the uncertainty about what the cyber policy covers for the seller and the buyer 






Cyber risk exclusions 
Insurance companies make exclusions in their insurance contracts also in a way to protect 
themselves against unexpected risk that they are not willing to accept from the client (Franke, 2017). 
Once insurers are increasingly excluding cyber coverage under existing policies it places a growing 
focus on the need and value of standalone policies (Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018). 
EIOPA presented in its study, “Understanding Cyber Insurance: a structured dialogue with insurance 
companies” in 2018, the main exclusions reported by the participant companies (13 (re)insurance 
groups based in Switzerland, France, Italy, Germany and UK): war, political risks, nuclear, (cyber) 
terrorist attacks, property and material damages, bodily injury, unauthorized collection of data by 
the insured, strike, infrastructure failure, theft of telecommunications services, online gambling, 
large online consumer auctions, payday loan companies, non-malicious cyber, natural perils, 
contingent business interruption (CBI), directors and officer (D&O) warranties, claims from internet 
service providers, regulatory fines, economic value of data, extortion payments, adult entertainment, 
online and offline dating agents, online sales of firearms, virtual currencies (EIOPA, 2018). 
The research of Franke, “The cyber insurance market in Sweden” in 2017, stated also another two 
possible exclusions that fits to modern concerns. One of them is the offering to cover internal 
outages and outages at external service providers. Some companies do not make any distinction 
between internal or external service providers, but others may have restrictions allowing coverage 
only to a specific list of providers (Franke, 2017). The other one is the coverage offered for 
subsidiaries and corporate entities in different jurisdictions (Franke, 2017). 
Also, legal restrictions might prevent certain coverage for cyber insurance. For example, in many 
countries, insuring against regulatory fines is prohibited (Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, 2015). 
 
4.2.3. Requirements and controls 
Requirements and controls on the insured – Supply Side 
 
In the supply side, some insurers have a basic criterion that need to be fulfilled by costumers in order 
to get a cyber insurance offer. As stated above, insurance companies are not willing to insure any 
risks. A study done by Ulrik Franke, “The cyber insurance market in Sweden”, stated that insurers 
offers can vary from none, partial or total protection, depending on the outcome of a customer’s risk 
assessment (Franke, 2017).  
Nowadays insurance companies not only require knowing but might also validate a customers’ 
preparation level and assist them by offering consulting, cyber risk assessment or incident response 
services (ENISA, 2016).  
The process of assessing the costumer’s exposure to risk vary from company to company. According 
to AIR study, “Insuring Cyber risk” in 2017, there are several ways of assessing a costumer or a 
potential one cyber risk’s exposure. It can be, for example, through self-assessment questionnaires 
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to costumers, additional reports developed in-house by cyber risk engineers, externally resources 
provided by specialized consultancies such as auditors and IT security consultants (who may perform 
e.g. penetration tests), letting the procedure depend on the costumer or through interviews with 
stakeholders such as Chief Information Officer (CIO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) (AIR, 2017). Insurers become a ‘de facto regulator’ by establishing a minimum-security 
level to gain cyber coverage (Woods & Simpson, 2017). So, cyber risk assessment is a way for 
insurance companies to control the risk they are taken in but also gives opportunity to customers 
increase awareness of cyber risk exposure, potentially increasing self-protective efforts and maybe 
get a lower premium (Franke, 2017).  
ENISA stated in its study, “Cyber insurance: recent advances, good practices and challenges” in 2016, 
that when assessing a clients’ risk, insurers generally focus on the following main categories (ENISA, 
2016):  
• Dedicated Resources – validate the presence of leadership roles with Information 
Security focus; the number of employees that are dedicated to Information Security; 
the time allocation to tasks other than what their role mandates and the reporting 
lines of a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO); 
• Policies and Procedures - validate the existence of an Information Security program 
(covers technical, administrative and physical measures for data protection); 
• Employee Awareness – validate the presence of a formal Security Awareness program, 
which is a key element for safeguarding the human factor within a company. Top 
management, brand managers, social media page administrators and all the other 
employees should have regular and tailored training on how to implement, monitor 
and enforce the guidelines that the policy has set out; 
• Incident Response – validate the existence of an Incident Response program. It defines 
the processes and resources that an organization engages for addressing any 
Information Security incidents. Response plans should include preliminary drafts of 
communications to all stakeholders including customers, suppliers, regulators, 
employees, the board, shareholders, and even the general public. The plan should also 
consider legal requirements around timelines to report breaches. 
• Security Measures - confirm the proper implementation of Business Continuity 
Planning, data classification, data retention, access control, log monitoring, intrusion 
detection, network segmentation, network monitoring, vulnerability management 
(ENISA, 2016), penetration testing and scanning of systems (EIOPA, 2018).  
 
Additionally, and according to the same source, under the questionnaires applied to several 
European insurers, they pointed as a good security measure the compliance with some Cyber 
Security Standards such as: Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH), ISO 27000 family, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) and Sarbanes-




Requirements and controls of the insured – Demand Side 
On the demand side, organizations should ask if they are making the appropriate investments in 
security, vigilance, and resilience, and whether those decisions are based on a realistic understanding 
of the specific risks their organization faces as well as the magnitude of impact that a cyber-attack 
could have (RSA, 2016).  
Insureds will need to demonstrate that they fulfill certain “cyber hygiene” and pre-loss standards in 
order to obtain indemnification. To be effective, cybersecurity needs to be addressed at all levels of 
an institution and with respect to relevant third-party arrangements (IAIS, 2016).  
It is very unlikely and most probably impossible to prevent all cyber losses due to the ever-growing 
frequency and complexity of the criminal efforts to steal data. Indeed, in some areas the cost to 
mitigate the risk may be many times more than the actual loss of that piece of data. It is however 
essential to implement controls which can help minimize the potential impact to the organization 
(IRM, 2014). 
 If a company can show that it has adopted a set of practices generally considered to be worthwhile 
things to do with respect to cyber-security, then this will reduce information asymmetries and better 
demonstrate to the market that the firm takes security seriously. This feeds into premiums once if an 
insurer can observe that a firm is undertaking various ‘effective’ security measures, then the 
premium will be reduced on the basis that the firm is less prone to risks (ENISA, 2012).   
 
Advantages to invest cybersecurity: 
 
Deloitte Advisory Cyber Risk Services stated, in RSA study “Cyber risk appetite: Defining and 
Understanding Risk in the  Modern Enterprise”, that “managing cyber risk is not just a cost to the 
business, but a positive investment to enable the success of strategic growth and performance 
initiatives” (RSA, 2016). In fact, there are several advantages in choosing to invest in cybersecurity. 
The points below show the risk mitigation main advantages recognized by several sources: 
• Improved business performance;  
• Competitive advantage through a stronger customer value proposition; 
• Greater organizational awareness of cyber risk and its potential impact on the 
business. The process of seeking insurance coverage requires policyholders to 
understand (and quantify) the risk that they face in order to determine the amount of 
coverage that they require (OECD, 2017); 
• Internal transparency on cyber risks and controls in place. Generating an organization-
wide approach to ongoing cyber risk management by all aspects of the organization 
(EIOPA, 2018); 
• Assessing the strength of cyber defenses, particularly among a rapidly changing cyber 
environment (EIOPA, 2018); 
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• Clear compliance with external regulatory controls. The underwriting process will 
usually involve an assessment of risk management and security practices, including 
recommendations on further preventative measures that could be taken (OECD, 
2017); 
• Incentives for firms to increase IT security in order to reduce premiums (ENISA, 2012).  
• Demonstrate strong business practices to investors (ENISA, 2012);  
• Incentives and means to promulgate best practices (ENISA, 2012). 
 
4.2.4. Underdevelopment causes 
As stated above, cyber insurance is gaining field as a good measure to manage cyber risk, but some 
aspects hold it back.  
Camillo stated in his study, ”Cyber risk and the changing role of insurance”, that during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, companies focused mainly in loss mitigation through network security and, in that 
time and still nowadays, cyber insurance market remains a niche area, lacking the scope and capacity 
once a cyber insurance product remains untested and there are a lack of historical loss data. 
Furthermore, EIOPA in its paper, “Understanding cyber insurance” in 2018, concluded that “there is a 
clear need for a deeper understanding of cyber risk, both on the supply and demand side, for the 
European cyber insurance industry to develop further. This relates not only to the assessment and 
treatment of risks in new cyber insurance propositions, but also to the understanding of clients’ own 
needs” (EIOPA, 2018). 
It will be described below a gathering, collected from different sources, of the main causes for cyber 
insurance market underdevelopment and the challenges felt by supply and demand: 
Insurers – Supply side 
• The information asymmetries inherent in cyber risk: moral hazard and adverse 
selection. They are the most widely spoken causes for the underdevelopment of cyber 
insurance market. In the adverse selection problem, the insurer cannot discriminate 
different types of customer before a contract is signed and therefore price the 
premium accordingly (ENISA, 2012). Besides that, firms that have experienced a cyber-
attack are more likely to purchase insurance resulting in adverse selection once a firm 
may apply for cyber insurance in the knowledge that they are relatively more exposed 
to cyber risk. In the moral hazard problem, the insured, once a contract is signed, may 
be incentivized to behave more insecurely in the knowledge that the insurer will bear 
some of the loss (Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, 2015); 
• The perception of effectiveness of various types of cyber-security measures 
implemented by costumers. It is essential for the process of offering a cyber insurance 
product that the insurance company knows exactly the extension of risk that the 
costumer is exposed to in order to accept or refuse to take that risk. Sometimes that 
process is not so much transparent (ENISA, 2012); 
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• The misevaluation of accumulation risk. Cyber risk is not an isolated threat. There are 
several potential correlated exposures to this risk that are very difficult to predict and 
to estimate their probable losses. These correlations can be present through third 
party, outsourcing exposures or through non-affirmative risks or “silent” risks6. It is a 
challenge for insurance companies to be certain about the number of customers that 
would be affected. Many insurers set relatively low limits and a multitude of exclusions 
to try to control their potential losses, in addition to high premiums. The potential for 
accumulation risks may discourage some insurers and reinsurers from entering the 
cyber insurance market at all (EIOPA, 2018); 
• Lack of government intervention as ‘insurer of last resort’ may inhibit cyber insurance 
supply (ENISA, 2012); 
• The ever-changing form of cyber threats. This causes that a control measure that may 
have been effective a year ago may now prove to be a vulnerability. Technology 
innovations drives fluctuations in risk and threats that makes it difficult (from an 
actuarial perspective) to forecast future losses from past events and utilizing predictive 
analytics for the assessment of potential risks and impacts (IRM, 2014); 
• Lack of commonality in risk assessment language - there is not an implemented 
standardized linguistic among institutions (ENISA, 2017); 
• Lack of specialized underwriters, robust actuarial data and quantitative tools (EIOPA, 
2018) (OECD, 2018). The absence of relevant data series on past losses, the limited 
actuarial information available on the frequency and size of actual and potential cyber 
security incidents and the lack of stochastic models are key obstacles preventing 
insurers from developing the predictive models they depend on to set accurate 
premiums, exposure models and the provision of proper coverage; 
• Reduced willingness of insurance companies to extend significant amounts of 
coverage. The topic is the main responsible to this reduction and leads to cyber 
insurance offers with several exclusions and sub-limits that customers may find 








6 Non-affirmative risks or “silent” risks – ““Silent cyber”, also known as “unintended” or “non-
affirmative” cyber, refers to the unknown or unquantified exposures originating from cyber perils that may 






Companies – Demand Side 
• The absence of clarity on coverage, policy terms and conditions - The lack of similar 
terminology and different approaches to offering coverage, along with the complexity 
of the policies themselves, add to the frustration and reduce buyer demand (EIOPA, 
2018); 
•  The lack of understanding by clients of their own risks - Many companies believed that 
they have nothing a cyber adversary would seek for or they only start to be aware of 
that threat from the day they are attacked (EIOPA, 2018); 
•  The perception that existing insurance already covers cyber-risks - Some companies 
already think that they are insured under existing traditional policies, so they are 
discouraged from taking out specific cyber-insurance policies on the basis of a fear of 
being over-insured (EIOPA, 2018); 
•  The reputational implications of sharing information - some companies fear in sharing 
information under a full transparency and non-anonymized approach. This would 
prevent the collection of data, the spread of good practices among companies and 
consequently the development of the sector (EIOPA, 2018); 
•  The premiums charged for cyber insurance coverage are high and variable -  Given the 
large tail risks and uncertainties around cyber risk, cyber insurance is currently 
relatively expensive compared to other types of insurance coverage, with estimations 
that can be three times more expensive than general liability coverage and six times 
more expensive than property insurance This became cyber insurance market 
unattractive for companies. (EIOPA, 2018).  
 
For that main challenges faced by the cyber insurance market are already possible solutions. In the 
study developed by EIOPA, they stated some of those possibilities such as insurers could introduce 
explanatory sessions to their customers to provide understanding about their potential exposures to 
cyber risk and provide customer scenarios and generic examples of policy coverage once could act as 
a fast method to raise awareness and understanding of cyber insurance; they could also make a 
review of the wording in contracts in order to clarify the policy language and avoid using generic 
terminology that can be interpreted in multiple ways; they could also offer a transparent 
underwriting process, detailing the criteria and criticality that drives pricing and develop a Risk 
Assessment Guidelines in order to facilitate the analysis of their costumers exposure to risk. 
In the costumers side, ENISA stated in its study, “Cyber Insurance: recent advances, good practices 
and challenges” developed in 2016, that organizations should get informed, prepared, and document 
their environment, before requesting a cyber insurance policy possibly by attending in explanatory 
sessions or provide specialized training to employees and nominate a CISO for companies in order to 
institutionalize the culture of cyber risk management in the organization structure. 
Eling&Wirfs stated in their study, “Cyber Risk: Too Big to Insure?”, possible top five measures to 
improve insurability of cyber risk and hence help to develop the market. They are to incentivize the 
development of an anonymized data pool; develop minimal standards for risk mitigation; introduce 
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reporting obligations; incentivize the development of “traditional” risk transfer mechanisms and 
establish a governmental backstop for extreme scenarios (Eling & Wirfs, 2016). 
Additionally, general initiatives in terms of legislation and government intervention can also improve 
significantly the development of the market. A study of Daniel Woods and Andrew Simpson, “Policy 
measures and cyber insurance: a framework” in 2017, stated that “insurance industry should be 
more involved in the Cyber Security Information-Sharing Partnership (CISP), which enables 
government and industry to share information”. They believe that one of the major ways of 
managing cyber risks is through appropriate sharing of technical information and data.  
 
Government intervention 
Governments can potentially play a role in supporting the development of the market and 
maximizing the contribution it makes to manage this fast-evolving risk. However, this is a field that 
need to be developed. 
The study done by Elling&Wirfs, pointed out in its main conclusions that “cyber risks “of daily life” 
are not too big to insure” but on the other hand, ““extreme scenarios” (e.g., a breakdown of the 
critical infrastructure for a period long enough to impact the economy (EIOPA, 2018)) are difficult to 
insure.” They propose that insurability for those “extreme scenarios” could be improved by 
“integrating the government in various ways.” In the same study they structured possible means of 
governmental intervention (Eling & Wirfs, 2016). They are presented in annex 10 of this work. 
Sharing the same opinion, EIOPA under their paper “Understanding Cyber Insurance - A Structured 
Dialogue with Insurance Companies” in 2018, stated that government intervention might be needed 
in case of extreme events. Once cyber risk has a great potential for significant accumulation of losses 
and it is difficult to estimate the extent of major cyber incidents, the government is often seen as a 
potential last resort of the system. 
 
4.3. CYBERSECURITY IN BANKING SECTOR 
A bank runs multiple servers that store enormous amount of information and details of various 
operations such as credit cards, real time gross settlements, ATMs and SWIFT and others. Financial 
institutions adopt digital channels like online banking and mobile banking to increase access and 
provide convenience to customers but at the same time it grows the attack surface once it opens the 
door to online security risks (Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018). 
According to Reddy and Bhargavi study, “Cyber security attacks in banking sector: Emerging security 
challenges and threats” in 2018, cybersecurity attacks increased in the banking industry during 2016 
and they have not shown any signs of abating. The risks are prevalent across all areas of the sector 
affecting large and small banks. Banking institutions are considered a gainful target for cybercrime 
once they are a source where the money and important information is (Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018). 
In the European Banking Authority (EBA) semi-annual Risk Assessment Questionnaires (RAQs) among 
53 European banks and 15 market analysts, carried out in 2018, it was concluded that more than 50% 
of banks expected an increase in operational risk in their institution. The main driver identified by 
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banks was cyber risk and data security (around 90%). Around 55% of market analysts saw an increase 
in EU banks’ operational risk, mainly driven by legal risk, cyber risk and data security (both agreed by 
90% of respondents), followed by IT failures (65%) (EBA, 2018). This reinforces the idea of a growing 
trend of cyber-attacks occurrence in the sector. 
Cyber-attacks to banks can take many forms. Commonly the attackers are seeking to acquire capital 
as well as confidential data and sensitive information. According to, Reddy and Bhargavi, based on 
the number of recent attacks, they estimate that many banks are not mature and prepared to deal 
with this kind of threats and need to address their financial-crime security efforts across the board 
(Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018). The cyber security attacks most common on banks, according to the 
author are phishing, cross site scripting, vishing, cyber-squatting, bot networks, malware, denial-of-
service (DoS) attack, SMS tricking, Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing, pharming, insider threats, SMS One 
Time Password (OTP) attacks. More details about these cyber threats are shown in annex 7 of this 
work. 
Many statistics can also be found on the most common types of cyberattacks in financial and 
insurance services. Although differences can be observed in these statistics across research sources, 
there is a broad consensus that DoS, web application attacks and payment card skimming represent 
many security incidents. The most common purpose for these attacks is financial, whereas a small 
share is driven by espionage and other purposes. For the vast majority of cyberattacks, the 
compromised data are credentials (CEPS & ECRI, 2018). 
Cyber events can disrupt financial services and undermine the security and confidence of the 
financial system (Institute of International Finance, 2018). If the attack is large enough it could even 
lead to the disruption of the global financial system and on overall financial stability (Institute of 
International Finance, 2018). 
According to Banco the Portugal study, the main risks associated to cybersecurity incidents in 
banking sector are financial risk, reputational risk, operational risk and legal risk (Banco de Portugal, 
2019). The annex 11 shows several examples of those risks. 
 
4.4. LEGISLATION IN FINANCIAL SECTOR - OVERVIEW 
Authorities around the world have developed strategic initiatives, guidance papers, regulatory and 
supervisory approaches aiming to strengthen the cyber-resilience of both individual institutions and 
the global financial system (Institute of International Finance, 2018). 
It is evident that regions with established cybersecurity-related legislation, have a higher cyber 
insurance adoption than regions that have recent or no formed legislation. The expected growth for 
the European market is anticipated to be further accelerated by the adoption of the GDPR and NIS 
directive (ENISA, 2016). 
According to a study done by EIOPA, “Understanding Cyber Insurance: a structured dialogue with 
insurance companies” in 2018, they collect that the predominant view of the study’s respondents 
was that the expected increase in demand for cyber insurance will be more gradual rather than 
abrupt. Reasons for this are that it is yet unclear whether GDPR fines and fees will be insurable and 
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the fact that the new regulation is very extensive, with most companies focusing on compliance for 
now. However, it is expected that GDPR will ultimately increase awareness of cyber risk and 
stimulate demand for cyber insurance (EIOPA, 2018).  
Regulatory changes are found to impact cyber insurance to a great extent. Whether these have the 
form of mandatory notification, introduction of fines, or “right to know” for users – they ultimately 
result in a better market preparation, of which cyber insurance is a part of (ENISA, 2016). 
Regulation may be welcomed by the industry in a moderate fashion, as it could help to address some 
of the identified challenges notwithstanding the need for compliance with the Solvency II-Directive 
(2009/138/EU) (EIOPA, 2018). Some participants in EIOPA study raised the importance of 
harmonization of a potential supervisory framework across countries. In that context, an additional 
area for follow-up work for EIOPA would be to investigate the possibility of introducing (a) new line-
of-business code(s) in Solvency II, which could help provide more insights into the quantitative 
dimension of cyber insurance (EIOPA, 2018). 
One of the key challenges for the insurance sector will be to adjust to the increase in demand 
following the new regulation and the changing customer needs and risk profiles (EIOPA, 2018). 
EIOPA suggested some potential contributions of regulation for market development. They are 
(EIOPA, 2018): 
• Ensure appropriate pricing and monitoring of the risks, including potential aggregation 
risks; 
• Ensure incident reporting and exchange of information; 
• Regulatory practices envisioning better understanding of risks; 
• Introduction of minimum IT and Information security standards; 
• Enhance the level of awareness and prudence of new entrants; 
• Adequate capital requirements against underwriting risks; 
• Avoidance of contagion in case of bigger scale events; 
• Ensure adequate estimation of value for money measures; 




In order to recognize the supply of cyber risk insurance in the banking sector operating in Portugal, 
this work will consist on a literature review and an empirical study. 
The literature review aims to convey the “state of the art” of cyber risk insurance market and 
comprises an overview of cyber risk, its main sources and types of cyber incidents; an overview of 
cyber insurance, the most common covers and exclusions of a cyber insurance contracts and an 
overview of the cyber insurance market for banking sector, including the most common cyber 
incidents that banks are exposed. 
In turn, the empirical study aims, through the practical application of online questionnaires, to verify 
the perception of insurers (the sellers or potential sellers) of this risk and their willingness to sell this 
insurance product. There will be two questionnaires applied to each of the market participants: 
• National or international insurers operating in Portugal that sell or not insurance 
against cyber risk: the department to be questioned varies according to the structure 
of the insurer. The main purpose is to be applied to the department that developed or 
could develop the insurance product (production, underwriting or other specific 
direction); 
• Supervisory Authority (ASF). 
 
The study under analysis aims to assess the knowledge and development of Portuguese insurance 
market in relation to the offer of cyber insurance. For the purpose of work feasibility, the area of 
study was restricted for the specific case in which the client seeking for that product is a banking 
institution. So, the questionnaires applied had some general questions but other intended to catch 
the situation were the offer is specific for a bank. 
The various questions that constitutes these surveys, as well as the respective options of answer, 
were based on this work’s literature review.  
It is a type of explanatory study whose statistical analysis will be carried out through excel.  
The data collection will comprise the period from June 2019 to January 2020. 
The questionnaires are anonymous, in order to safeguard the participants' data and the results 
obtained will be used only for academic purposes. 
The questionnaire is divided into four parts: A) General information of the company, B) Knowledge of 
cyber risk, C) Cyber risk insurance and D) Perception of cyber risk's market evolution. Annexes 12 and 
13 show the questionnaires structure and the literature review sources from which the questions 
were developed.  
The table below associates the several chapters and subchapters of the literature review with the 





applied to insures 
Chapter/subchapter of Literature review 
A. General information 
of the company 
- 
B. Knowledge of cyber 
risk 
Chapters/Subchapters: 4.1.2. Categories and Subcategories of Cyber Risk; 4.2.2. 
Coverages and exclusions 
 
Main articles: 
ENISA. (2016). Cyber Insurance: recent advances, good practices and challenges.  
 
Cebula, & Young. (2010). A Taxonomy of Operational Cyber. 
 
OECD. (2018). Enhancing the role of insurance in cyber risk management. The 
cyber insurance market: Responding to a risk with few boundaries.  
 
Marsh, & McLENNAN. (2018). Cyber Risk Management. Response and Recovery.  
 
EIOPA. (2018). Understanding Cyber Insurance: a structured dialogue with 
insurance companies. 
 
C. Cyber risk insurance Chapters/Subchapters: 4.2.2. Coverages and exclusions; 4.2.3. Requirements and 
Controls; 4.2.4. Underdevelopment causes 
 
Main articles: 
EIOPA. (2018). Understanding Cyber Insurance: a structured dialogue with 
insurance companies.  
 
OECD. (2017). Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management. 
 
ENISA. (2016). Cyber Insurance: recent advances, good practices and challenges.  
 
OECD. (2017). Supporting an Effective Cyber Insurance Market. OECD Report for 
the G7 Presidency. 
 
Marsh, & McLENNAN. (2018). Cyber Risk Management. Response and Recovery.  
 
Franke, U. (2017). The cyber insurance market in Sweden. 
 
 Biener, C., Eling, M., & Wirfs, J. H. (2015). Insurability of Cyber Risk: an empirical 
analysis. 
 
ENISA. (2012). Incentives and barriers of the cyber insurance market in Europe. 
 
AIR. (2017). Insuring Cyber Risk. What is holding cyber insurance back, and how 
can the industry push forward?  
 
 Marsh. (2018). Governing Cyber Risk. A guide for company boards. TheCityUK. 
 





 Eling, M., & Wirfs, J. H. (2016). Cyber Risk - Too Big to Insure? 
 
D. Perceived market 
evolution for cyber risk 
Chapters/Subchapters: 4.2.4. Underdevelopment causes; 4.3. Cybersecurity in 
Banking Sector; 4.4. Legislation in Financial Sector - Overview 
 
Main articles: 
EIOPA. (2018). Understanding Cyber Insurance: a structured dialogue with 
insurance companies.  
 
ESA. (2019). Joint Advice of the European Supervisory Authorities to the European 
Commission on the need for legislative improvements relating to ICT risk 
management requirements in the EU financial sector.  
 
Eling, M., & Wirfs, J. H. (2016). Cyber Risk - Too Big to Insure? 
 






6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to make both the observation of the results and its discussion more understandable, this 
next chapter is divided into the four parts that make up the questionnaire applied to insurers. In its 
conclusion there will be presented the answers to the survey applied to the ASF. 
A. General information of the company 
The empirical analysis was based on an online questionnaire that targeted insurance companies 
operating in Portugal, of national or foreign origin, selling or not insurance against cyber risk. 
Responses were obtained from 9 insurance companies, 4 of which were of national origin. 
 
B. Knowledge of cyber risk 
The majority of the participants, more specifically 5 of them, stated having basic knowledge 
regarding cyber risk. There was only one that stated having advanced knowledge on the topic. The 
other three felt they had only limited knowledge.  
One of the questions asked to the participants was centered on knowing what they considered to be 
the main sources of cyber risk a bank would be exposed to. Most participants considered the action 
of people as the main source of cyber risk, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. In fact, the literature review 
presented above confirms this perception. The action of people is indicated as one of the main 
sources of cyber risk for companies. This source is essentially composed by employees of the 
institutions and can be deliberate, inadvertent or inactive actions. 
 




The systems and technology failures like software, hardware and systems in general were considered 
the second major source of cyber risk for a bank with 78% of respondents contemplating it. 
Regarding the main types of risk that banks are most exposed to, insurers unanimously consider data 
confidentiality breach as the major one. Malicious code attacks, cyber-extortion and cyber-fraud 
were also considered to be the most recurring incidents, as shown in figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2 Banks’ exposure to types of Cyber Risk 
 
This perception is in line with what was found in the literature review. Banking institutions suffer 
from this type of attacks largely for financial reasons and for the purpose of extortion of money and 
compromising the data confidentiality. These are the main targets for criminals. 
According to Banco de Portugal, banking institutions are exposed to financial, reputational, 
operational and legal risks. Figure 6.3 show that most participating insurers consider business 
interruption (operational risk), reputational damage (reputational risk) and financial loss from 






Figure 6.3 Impacts of cyber-attacks on banks 
 
C. Cyber risk insurance 
Regarding the offer of an insurance against cyber risk, only 2 of the participating insurers sell the 
product. Some of the reasons mentioned by the others for not offering this insurance were the lack 
of awareness to cyber risk, the lack of information to design and implement this kind of product and 
the very high costs associated with it. It was also pointed that there is still a small market in Portugal, 
which lacks scalability, and also a short demand. Besides that, the problems of which guarantees are 
covered and how the cyber-attack would be actually measured in case of a claim were also stated. In 
fact, some of those difficulties are the same as referred in chapter 4 (Underdeveloped causes) of the 
literature review. 
The Portuguese market faces the same challenges international markets have faced and still face. 
This is mainly because we are still in the early steps of cyber risk insurance development in Portugal. 
Basically, insurers are beginning to realize the need for this product, but at the same time, there are 
still many factors to hold its development back. 
The two insurers offering cyber risk sell it as a stand-alone product (a specific insurance for cyber 
risk) and one of them also sells a specific endorsement on existing policies (an add-on coverage to 
traditional lines of business). Both cover 1st party costs and one also cover 3rd party costs. 
As with the study “Enhancing the Role of Insurance in Cyber Risk Management”, presented by the 
OECD in 2017, which graphically presents the loss categories commonly included in stand-alone 
policies, showed in subchapter 4.2.2 Coverages and exclusions of this work, figure 6.4 intends to 
apply the same research to the participating companies but focusing only in banking institutions. The 




Figure 6.4 Loss categories commonly included in stand-alone policies 
 
“Cyber ransom and extortion” and “Communication and media liability” were the loss categories 
stated by both participating insurers that correspond also to the most voted ones in the OECD study.  
Reputational damage, as already stated above, is a loss that the financial sector is most exposed to 
and so it was referred by both insurers too, as the loss categories included in stand-alone policies 
offered to banks. 
The last 4 categories (“professional services E&O and professional indemnity”; “legal protection - 
Lawyer fees”; “contingent business interruption (CBI) for nonphysical damage” and “assistance 
coverage - psychological support”) were added to the OECD list of loss categories. “Legal protection 
(lawyer fees)” was referred by both insurers as necessary to be included in stand-alone policies in the 
case of a bank costumer. 
As mentioned in the literature review, the process of offering a product against cyber risk is often 
accompanied by a risk assessment. This serves not only so that insurers can analyze what type of risk 
their client is exposed to but also as to adjust their offer to each reality so as not to take too much 
unexpected risk. 
When questioned about the implementation of cyber risk assessment in banks, only one of the 
insurers stated to do so. The practices adopted were self-assessment questionnaires applied to 
costumers, external support from specialized consultancies such as auditors and IT security 
consultants, who may perform e.g. penetration tests. The insurer affirm that its offer depends on the 
risk assessment made. 
Additionally, there are some costumer´s criteria that insurers refer to assess, not in the context of a 
formal risk assessment. They are essentially policies and procedures of the institution, vendor 
40 
 
management systems (supply chain), data classification, log monitoring and network monitoring. 
Besides that, both insurers selling cyber insurance claimed to offer additional services with the 
product such as: risk management services, incident response services, cyber risk assessment, cash 
advance abroad, psychological counseling, 24/7 assistance or security check up. This shows the care 
taken by insurers to evaluate their client's cyber hygiene. 
Furthermore, and in line with literature review, the insurers state that pricing is affected by 
technology prevention measures, procedures implemented and maturity of customers. It will 
ultimately persuade banks to improve their cybersecurity practices and to purchase a cyber 
insurance product. 
Regarding the sale of a product against cyber risk, participating insurers were asked about the main 
obstacles or potential obstacles to the sale of this insurance. Figure 6.5 shows the answers: 
 
Figure 6.5 Main obstacles to selling cyber policies 
 
The answers agree with the main reasons why most participating companies do not market the 
product, already discussed above. The lack of understanding by clients of their own risks and not 
understanding exposures were unanimously referred. In fact, the Portuguese market is still a few 
steps back when it comes to this subject. 
However, although there is still a long way to go, there is actually already awareness to the fact that 
the development of an insurance dedicated to cyber risk brings numerous benefits to its customers. 
Among the options suggested in the questionnaire, 78% of insurers considered that this type of 
insurance promotes a greater organizational awareness of cyber risk and its potential impact on the 





Figure 6.6 Main advantages to have a dedicated cyber insurance policy 
 
Some authors considered that also government participation could boost the growth of the cyber 
insurance market. When taken in account the current state of cyber risk in Portugal, 56% of the 
companies believe so. Figure 6.7 shows how the participants considered the government should act. 
 
Figure 6.7 Ways of government participation in cyber risk insurance market  
 
Indirect governmental intervention (in general) was indicated by 45% of the participants. This 
includes the implementation of cyber risk insurance as mandatory, carrying out incentives for self-
insurance across subsidies through security spending or intensifying the penalties in case of 
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misbehavior. In addition, 22% of the participants referred that indirect/implicit governmental 
intervention (cyber specific) was the best way of intervention. This implied the creation of an 
anonymized data pool to exchange experience and information, the establishment or intensification 
of reporting obligations, the creation of new laws for data protection and the establishment of 
national standards for cyber risk in order to harmonize the principles for the market in general. 
 
D. Perception of cyber risk's market evolution 
This last section aims to capture the opinion of insurers regarding the evolution of the cyber 
insurance market. Most participating entities (56%) have been noticing an increase in the demand for 
cyber insurance products in the last 2 years.  
It is the general opinion that the market will start or continue to grow in the coming years once the 
increase in awareness increases the demand. However, this growth is not expected to come easily 
since it requires much more clarification on the subject, both in terms of pricing, coverage, 
exclusions, exposure to risk, both on the side of the costumer and the seller. 
As mentioned in the literature review, it is expected that the adoption of GDPR will accelerate the 
European market. The participating insurers share the same opinion, 78% of them consider that 
GDPR will ultimately increase awareness of cyber risk and stimulate demand for cyber insurance. 
The last question asked was which controls should be applied to improve insurability of cyber risk. 
The development of regulation in order to standardize requirements, procedures and risk 
terminology and the development of platforms to exchange information about cyber incidents were 
the most voted options, as shown in figure 6.8.  
 
 
Figure 6.8 Biggest controls to improve the insurability of cyber risk 
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In fact, these could be measures that would help the market development through the spread of 
information and uniformization of the topic throughout the major intervenient (suppliers and 
customers). But it is still difficult to take the first steps in a topic that is still unknown and can have so 
many impacts to the costumer and to the insurer. 
Supervisory Framework 
Another aspect addressed in this work is the perspective of insurers in relation to the supervisory 
framework in the market for cyber risk. When asked whether the supervisory framework could in any 
way restrict market growth, most insurers (78%) responded that they did not. 
In fact, many efforts have been made at European level, by EIOPA, on the issue of cyber risk and the 
new challenges it poses for the insurance industry. In Portugal, ASF and APS are the two entities that 
work together with market insurers, promoting the implementation of the Solvency II regime and the 
standardization of information throughout the market. Additionally, they raise awareness of this new 
risk. 
In order to understand the perspective of the supervisory entity about the cyber risk insurance for 
banking sector, a questionnaire was applied to them. The questionnaire can be seen in annex 13. 
As quoted by the ASF, they “have been closely following the developments in the area since the 
recent past, not only from the point of view of cyber risks as a menace to the functioning of insurance 
undertakings (i.e. operational risks), but also from the point of view of insurers as cyber risk 
underwriters”.  
Although they consider that the Portuguese cyber insurance market is in a very embryonic stage, 
they recognize its great growth potential. Besides that, they noticed that insurance companies in 
Portugal have included cyber risks in the top risks in the regular ASF’s risk survey7, which indicates an 
identification of the theme. 
However, ASF also recognizes some challenges for an insurance company to secure this risk. “The 
lack of information (largely associated to the fear of self-exposure in terms of cyber vulnerabilities) on 
cyber incidents makes it more difficult to quantify the effective exposure” and “the existence of silent 
or non-affirmative cyber covers, i.e. inadequately designed insurance policies which actually cover 
certain risks falling in the remits of cyber, but that have not been properly assessed/estimated” were 
the ones pointed. The first one was also pointed by insurers meaning that the lack of information is 
generalized opinion. 
When questioned about the preparedness of insurance companies operating in Portugal, under the 
ASF’s supervision, to sell cyber insurance, they stated that it is a matter under assessment. In fact, 
“the first undertakings offering cyber risk coverage in Portugal were entities operating globally, which 
had already developed this product in other countries, including outside the EU”. This is a lot due to 
all the difficulties that are being felt by the offer side already stated in the literature review. 
 
7 Report developed by ASF in August 2019, “Análise de Riscos do Setor Segurador e dos Fundos de 




Another topic asked to the supervisor was about the contribution of GDPR for the increase 
awareness of cyber risk and stimulation of demand for cyber insurance. They recognize the 
importance of it once “undertakings can now be exposed to majors’ fines in case of a data breach, 
especially if it is a consequence of poor or inadequate cybersecurity”. 
Finally, ASF was asked about possible controls to improve the insurability of cyber risk. This question 
was also requested from participating insurers and the answers were coincident. Like insurance 
companies, ASF also considers that the development of regulatory requirements, of platforms to 
increase data availability/exchange for cyber risk incidents  and insurance products and 
(re)insurance markets to cover cyber risks are the best controls that could be adopted. 
In ASF’s perspective, “it is important to develop a regulatory framework, according to which 
insurance undertakings adopt measures in order to prevent cyber incidents and reduce the probability 
of cyber-attacks. Hence, more than defining penalties for non-compliance, it is important to ensure 
that adequate measures are implemented in order ensure the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information”. In addition, “from the point of view of risk taking, it is important to 
ensure that insurers are able to adequately assess the risks they are exposed to and avoid cyber risks 
concentration”. 
Furthermore, in regard to the platforms to trade information on cyber incidents ASF considered that 
exchange of knowledge is very important and should be cultivated, e.g. by Governments, through 
their cybersecurity agencies, in order to have “complete, reliable and adequate data”. “The relevance 
of building such a data base goes beyond the insurance market, since it is relevant for all entities 
which have the intention to adopt adequate cybersecurity measures”. 
About the development of insurance products and (re)insurance markets to cover cyber risks, the 
supervision believe that it is essential to have an appropriate delimitation of the coverages and for 








This work intends to study the offer of cyber insurance for banking sector operating in Portugal.  
The literature review developed in this work aims to show how this new risk is being faced by 
insurers in the world and in Portugal, as well as the state of the art in relation to the development of 
insurance against this risk. 
The empirical study carried out aims to assess how the insurance sector in Portugal (insurers and 
ASF) is reacting to this new risk, what specific actions to take in case a customer is a bank and how 
they perceive the evolution of the market in the country. 
In fact, there is a great awareness in several countries around the world, including Portugal, that the 
actions of people, namely employees, are considered the greatest source of cyber risk for companies, 
both in the banking sector and in other sectors. These can be involuntary, through access to 
untrusted sites, emails that appear to be from secure sources or downloads, which jeopardize 
information security or volunteers, such as actions in bad faith. 
Attacks such as data confidentiality breach, in which confidential information is used and disclosed, 
malicious code attacks, cyber extortion and cyber fraud are the types of risk that participating 
insurers consider to be the ones that banks are most exposed to having major impacts such as 
business interruption, reputational damage and financial loss. 
So, participating insurers consider that their insurance offer to a bank should contain coverage 
against at least reputational damage, cyber ransom and extortion, communication and media 
liability. In fact, banking institutions operate based on the trust they generate in their customers, 
their reputation is fundamental to the success of their business. In addition, this sector is a major 
target for these types of threats since they are a source of money and sensitive information. That is 
why the above coverages are considered by the insurers to be the most important. 
Although the insurance market in Portugal is aware of this new threat, there are still many aspects 
that make insurance against this risk not appealing, both for those who buy it and for those who sell 
it. The lack of understanding of risk exposure on the part of customers, who often consider 
themselves already protected against the risk. 
The poorly standardized language in the underwriting process and the low clarification on coverages 
and exclusions are examples of that. Additionally, it is considered that the prices charged are too 
high and variable, making the purchase of the cyber insurance product unattractive. The lack of 
historical information makes it very difficult for insurers to develop robust actuarial models for 
estimating premiums and reserves, making the offer of this product not imperative. 
Besides these aspects that hold the market back, insurers consider that insurance would be a good 
strategy to be adopted by banks since it would contribute alone to raise awareness of this risk and its 





Finally, responding to the research questions proposed in this work, it is considered that the 
insurance companies operating in Portugal still do not have advanced knowledge about cyber risk. In 
addition, there is still no great offer of this product. However, participating insurers are aware of the 
possible exposures and impacts of a cyber-attack on a banking institution, which may indicate that 
when they develop cyber risk insurance, they will be aware of their client's needs. 
Of the participating insurers, only two sell specific insurance for cyber risk. One of them performs a 
risk assessment to its client and considers it essential when offering the product. In addition, both 
insurers consider that technology prevention measures, procedures implemented, and maturity of 
customers influence the pricing of cyber risk products. This means that insurers are not willing to 
accept risk at any price and that they take into account the innumerous aspects of their client's 
awareness and security measures when offering insurance. 
From the participating insurers and ASF’s point of view, the development of the cyber risk insurance 
market is far from being at its peak, however it is expected to increase gradually over the next few 
years, although there are still many obstacles to overcome. 
It is important, in their opinion, to create regulatory requirements, platforms for sharing information 
on cyber incidents and the development of insurance and reinsurance products against this risk in 
order to help the development of the market in the country. 
It is the general opinion that this is a market that is taking its first steps in Portugal, but whose 
















8. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORKS 
Cyber risk, cybersecurity and cyber risk insurance are constantly evolving and also increasingly 
studied topics. However, as we see from the work done, there is still a lot of work to do and many 
gaps to be filled. 
Initially the work was designed to cover the study of supply and demand for insurance against cyber 
risk. Questionnaires would be applied to insurers and also to banking institutions operating in 
Portugal, whether or not they purchased the insurance. The questionnaire to the banks was 
developed, but it was not applied due to the deadlines for delivering the thesis. The questions that 
make up the questionnaire can be seen in Annex 14. They essentially were intended to understand 
the demand side for insurance. I think it was one of the limitations of this work as it would enrich it.  
So, the application of the bank’s questionnaire is a future work recommendation since I think that it 
would be interesting to have the point of view from the institutions that buy besides from the ones 
that sell. 
Another major limitation, or rather saying difficulty, was the approach to insurers. Since it is a rather 
sensitive and still unknown subject, some insurers preferred not to state their opinion on the topic, 
even though the questionnaires were anonymous. 
Since this study focused on the perception and development of the cyber risk insurance market in 
Portugal, it would also be important to study the perspective of brokers and reinsurers on this 
subject.  
To make the analysis even more complete, a survey could be made to the institutions that work 
alongside with insurance companies in assessing customer’s risk in order to know their main 
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10. ANNEXES  
Annex 1. Cyber incident potential cost and consequences 
Cyber incident potential 
cost 
Definition 
Technical investigation Direct expenses for analysis to determine what happened during a cyber 
incident and who was responsible. It involves digital forensics, malware and 
threat analysis to determine root cause to assist in the remediation and 




Expenses associated with informing and advising individuals whose data has 
been compromised (can include printing, mailing, and call center services), as 
typically mandated by state or federal law or industry regulation. 
Post-breach customer 
protection 
Costs associated with services to detect and protect against potential data 
breaches. 
Regulatory compliance Fines or fees charged as a result of non-compliance with federal or state cyber 
breach related laws and/or regulations. 
Public relations Costs associated with managing external communications or brand 
monitoring following an incident. 
Attorney fees and 
litigation 
Legal advisory fees and settlement costs externally imposed, and costs 
associated with legal actions the company may take to defend its interests. 
Cybersecurity 
improvements 
Expenses for technical improvements to the infrastructure, security controls, 
monitoring capabilities, or surrounding processes, specifically to recover 




Additional costs an insured entity might incur to purchase or renew cyber risk 
insurance policies following a cyber incident.  
Increased cost to raise 
debt 
Organizations appear to be perceived as higher-risk borrowers during the 
months following a cyber incident facing higher interest rates for borrowed 
capital, either when raising debt, or when renegotiating existing debt. 
Impact of operational 
disruption or destruction 
Includes losses tied to manipulation or alteration of normal business 
operations and costs associated with rebuilding operational capabilities. This 
could include the need to repair equipment and facilities, build temporary 
infrastructure, divert resources from one part of the business to another, or 
increase current resources to support alternative business operations to 
replace the function of systems that have been temporarily shut down; it 
could also include losses associated with inability to deliver goods or services. 
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Source: (Deloitte, 2016) 
Lost value of customer 
relationships 
During an initial triage period immediately following a breach, it can be hard 
to track and quantify how many customers are lost.  
Value of lost contract 
revenue 
Includes revenue and ultimate income loss, as well as lost future opportunity 
associated with contracts that are terminated as a result of a cyber incident. 
Devaluation of trade 
name 
Intangible cost referring to the loss in value of the names, marks, or symbols 
an organization uses to distinguish its products and services.  
Loss of intellectual 
property (IP) 
Intangible cost associated with loss of exclusive control over trade secrets, 
copyrights, investment plans, patents and other proprietary and confidential 
information, which can lead to loss of competitive advantage, loss of revenue, 
and lasting and potentially irreparable economic damage to the company.  
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Annex 2. Cyber security incidents along the years in several sectors 





Data breach The retailer announced that over 45 million of its customers’ 









Stuxnet is a malicious computer worm that target industrial 
control systems. It infected over 200 000 computers and caused 
1 000 machines to physically degrade. 
(Camillo, 2017) 







Data breach Sony PlayStation attack exposed around 100 million user 
accounts brought the network down for nearly a month. 
(Camillo, 2017) 
2013 Target Retail 
sector 
 
Data breach Theft of approximately 40 million payment card records (along 
with 70 million other information records such as addresses and 
phone numbers).  
(OECD, 2016) 
(OECD, 2017) 




Data breach Attackers had used stolen logins that gain access to the mill’s 
control systems. The intrusion led to parts of the plant failing, 
meaning that the blast furnace could not be shut down as 
normal, resulting in significant damage.  
(OECD, 2017) 
(Camillo, 2017) 
2014 Sony Pictures Entertai
nment 
sector 
Data breach A hacker revealed  confidential data from the film studio Sony 
Pictures. The data included personal information about Sony 
Pictures employees and their families, e-mails between 
employees, information about executive salaries at the 









Data breach Personal Information such as names, date of birth, email 
addresses, passwords, credentials used to access other accounts 
outside Ebay and other information was stolen due to theft of 
three corporate employee log-in credentials.  
(Kosub, 2015) 
(Sidhu, Sakhuja, & 
Zhou, 2014) 
2014 Burger King Food 
sector 
Hi-jacking The company’s Twitter account had been hacked where its 
name had been changed to McDonalds and its background 
replaced with an image of Fish McBites. In the hour it took for 
officials to regain control, hackers proceeded to send 53 tweets 
to the burger chain’s more than 80 000 followers with jokes or 









Medical data breach resulted in 80 million records stolen. The 
hackers got access to sensitive information like names, 
birthdays, medical IDs, Social Security numbers and addresses.  
(OECD, 2016) 
 




Phishing Attackers used spear phishing to plant malware which disabled 
computers that controlled the system. 
It was a large-scale power disruption affecting electricity 











Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on domain name 
system provider Dyn shut down many of the world most popular 
websites, including Twitter, Spotify, GitHub, Netflix, Reddit, CNN 
and many others in the U.S. and Europe, for several hours. 
(AIR, 2017) 
(Camillo, 2017) 
2017 Equifax Business 
sector 
Data breach Over the course of three months, hackers exploited a website 
application vulnerability to access the personal data of as many 
as 143 million Americans. The exposed data include names, 
Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses and, in some 
instances, driver’s license numbers and credit card numbers. 
(OECD, 2018) 
(Pierce, 2017) 
2018 Marriott Tourism 
sector 
Data breach The Marriott Hotel confirmed that up to 500 million hotel 
guests’ information had been stolen in a data breach. The data 







Data breach Approximately 380 000 travellers who purchased plane tickets 
on the British Airways website and mobile app were robbed of 
their personal data, including their full credit card information. 
 (Forbes, 2018) 
2018 MyFitnessPal Health 
sector 
Data breach Cyber criminals gained access to over 150 million usernames, 
emails and passwords.  
 (Forbes, 2018) 






Hackers gained access to HealthCare.gov, the government’s 
Affordable Care Act enrolment website, compromising the 












Annex 3. Cyber security incidents along the years in banking sector 




Data breach Theft of 122 000 credit cards. (IMF & Bouveret, 2018) 
2011 
 
Citigroup Data breach The customer information such as contact details and account 
numbers from over 200 000 bank's customers were compromised.  






DDoS attack left the website offline for 5 hours. (IMF & Bouveret, 2018) 
2012 Federal 
Reserve Bank 
of New York 
Data breach Theft of property software code worth 9.5 million dollars. (IMF & Bouveret, 2018) 
2013 Banco Central 
del Ecuador 
Cyber-fraud 13.3 million dollars stolen from the account of the city of Riobamba 
at the central bank. 
(IMF & Bouveret, 2018) 
2014 JP Morgan Data breach 
Phising 
Names, emails and postal addresses, and phone numbers of account 
holders were obtained by hackers.  
(OECD, 2016) 
(CEPS & ECRI, 2018) 
2015 Central Bank 
of Azerbaijan 
Data breach Theft of thousands of bank customers’ information. (IMF & Bouveret, 2018) 
2016 Tesco Bank Data breach 
 
About 9 000 customers had money stolen from their online banking 
accounts. All other customers were affected by a temporary 
suspension of Tesco’s web banking system’s operations. 
(CEPS & ECRI, 2018) 
2016 Bangladesh 
Bank 
Cyber-fraud The SWIFT credentials of the Bangladesh central bank were used to 
transfer 81 million dollars from its account at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. 
(IMF & Bouveret, 2018) 
2016 Bank of Russia Cyber-fraud Cyber-attacks aimed at stealing 50 million dollars from 
correspondent bank accounts at the central bank, resulted in a loss 
of 22 million dollars. 







The Wannacry ransomware attack exploited a known vulnerability in 
older Windows operating systems, encrypting files and demanding a 
ransom to be paid for the decryption key. 
 (OECD, 2018) 
2017 Bank of Italy Data Breach Suspected hackers have accessed client data of Italy’s biggest 
lender, UniCredit. The attacks were carried out through an external 
commercial partner, which UniCredit did not identify. Biographical 
and loan data from 400 000 client accounts was stolen. 










NotPetya is regarded as a malware responsible for destroying data 
on the target's hard disk. It is estimated that as a result of supply 
chain disruptions, consumer goods manufacturers, transport and 
logistics companies, pharmaceutical firms and utilities reportedly 
suffered, in aggregate, over 1 billion dollars in economic losses.  
(IMF & Bouveret, 2018) 




Annex 4. Principles of Integrity, availability and confidentiality of data 
Category Definition  Examples 
Integrity Integrity issues relate to misuse of the 
systems, as is the case for fraud. 
Cyber-attacks may use hacking techniques to modify, 
destroy or otherwise compromise the intregrity of 
data. 
Availability Availability issues are linked to 
business disruptions. 
Denial of service attacks by botnets, for example, mau 
be used to prevent users from accessing data that 
would otherwise be available to them. 
Confidentiality Confidentiality issues arise when 
private information within a firm is 
disclosed to third parties as in the case 
of data breaches. 
Cyber-attacks may target various types of confidential 
information, often for criminal gain. 




















Annex 5. Sources classification of cyber risk 














Categories of Cyber Risk by source classification 
Non-criminal Sources 
Act of nature Power outage after a natural catastrophe; destruction of servers or computer 
facilities by flooding; fire 
Technical defects Hardware failure (for example data loss after a head crash of the hard-drive or a 
computer crash); bug in software 
Human failure Unintentionally disclosure of information on webpage; false report 
Business/strategic changes Changes in market or economic conditions; supplier changes or failures 
Criminal Sources 
Physical attacks Physical data theft (for example theft of confidential bank data by an employee) 
Hacker attacks Espionage of costumer data or sabotage of company processes (for example 
DoS attack; key logger or malware (for example virus, worms, spam-mails, 
Trojan horses) 
Extortion Threats by internet (for example Mexican drug cartel) 
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Annex 6. Categories and subcategories of cyber risk by source classification 
Categories/Subca
tegories of Cyber 
Risk 
Definition Elements Non-ciminal/Criminal 
Sources 
Actions of people 
  Inadvertent Unintentional actions taken without 
malicious or harmful intent. It can be 
internal unintentional or external 
unintentional depending if the 
human source of risk is within or 







Non-criminal - Human 
Failure 
  Deliberate Actions taken intentionally and with 
intent to do harm. It can be internal 
malicious or external malicious 
depending if the source of risk is 










Criminal - Physical attacks; 
Hacker attacks; Extortion 
  Inaction Lack of action or failure to act in a 
given situation 
Lack of appropriate skills, 
knowledge, guidance and 
availability of employees 
to take action 
 
Non-criminal - Human 
Failure 
Systems and technology failures 
   Hardware Risks traceable to failures in physical 
equipment 




Non-criminal - Technical 
defects 
   Software Risks stemming from software assets 
of all types, including programs, 




control, security settings, 
coding practices, and 
testing 
Non-criminal - Technical 
defects 
   Systems Failures of integrated systems to 








Failed internal processes 
Process design 
and/or execution 
Failures of processes to achieve their 
desired outcomes due to poor 
process design or execution 
Process flow, process 
documentation, roles and 
responsibilities, 
notifications and alerts, 
information flow, 
escalation of issues, 
service level agreements, 
and task hand-off 
Non-criminal - Human 
Failure 
Process controls Inadequate controls on the 
operation of the process 
Status monitoring, 
metrics, periodic review, 
and process ownership 




Failure of organizational supporting 






Non-criminal - Human 
Failure 
External events 
Catastrophes Events, both natural and of human 
origin, over which the organization 
has no control and that can occur 
without notice 
Weather event, fire, 
flood, earthquake, unrest 
Non-criminal - Act of 
nature; Technical defects; 
Human Failure; 
Business/strategic changes 
Criminal - Physical attacks; 
Hacker attacks; Extortion 
Legal issues Risk arising from legal issues Regulatory compliance, 
legislation, and litigation 
Non-criminal - Human 
Failure 
Business issues Risks arising from changes in the 
business environment of the 
organization 
Supplier failure, market 






Dependence on external parties Utilities, emergency 
services, fuel, and 
transportation 
Non-criminal - Act of 
nature; Technical defects; 
Human Failure; 
Business/strategic changes 
Criminal - Physical attacks; 
Hacker attacks; Extortion 




Annex 7. Examples of most common cyber incidents 
Cyber Incident Definition Examples 
Data confidentiality breach – 
third party or own data (Marsh 
& McLENNAN, 2018) 
Data breaches take place when unauthorized 
individuals (employees or outsiders of 
organizations) accidentally or deliberately copy, 
transmit, view, stole or use valuable corporate 
data, such as credit card or bank details, 
personal health information (PHI), personally 
identifiable information (PII), trade secrets of 
corporations or intellectual property,  to 
destinations outside of the organization’s 
network borders (IRM, 2014) (IMF & Bouveret, 
2018). It can be third-party or own data. 
Cyber espionage (IAIS, 2016) - any act undertaken clandestinely or under false 
pretenses that uses cyber capabilities to gather (or attempt to gather) information 
with the intention of communicating it to the opposing party (NATO, 2013); 
Point-of-sale (POS)  intrusions (IAIS, 2016) - A POS application is used on the sales 
counter of large retailers across the world and has the ability to charge a debit or 
credit card over the web or mobile network in real-time (Roy & Sarkar, 2014); 
Insider threats - insiders or employees of banks can disclose, modify or access the 
bank information illegally. It can be also, unintentional errors by employees (Reddy & 
Bhargavi, 2018); 
Crimeware - any form of malware used for criminal purpose (IAIS, 2016). 
Denial-of-service (DoS) attack or 
Distributed Denial-of-service 
(DDoS) (Marsh & McLENNAN, 
2018) 
A DoS is an attack in which a user or an 
organization is prevented from accessing a 
resource online. While as in DDoS attack, a 
specific system is targeted by a large group of 
compromised systems and make the services of 
the targeted system unavailable to its users 
(Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018).  
The targeted system is flooded with incoming messages which causes it to shut down 
and thus the system is unavailable to its users. Although DoS attacks don’t usually 
result in loss of information or security to a bank, it can cost the bank a great deal of 
time, money and customers and can also destroy programming and files in affected 
computer systems (Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018). 
Malicious code attack (IAIS, 
2016) 
A malicious code attack is any infection or 
threat of infection by a malware. A malware is 
designed to secretly access a computer system 
without the owner’s informed consent. The 
expression is a general term (short for malicious 
Virus - Designed to copy itself and propagate from one computer file to another, 
usually by attaching itself to program files (Gupta, 2013); 
Trojan horses - A program that seems to be genuine and even useful, and thereby 
tricks the users to install/use it (Gupta, 2013); 
Worms - A worm will infect other computers, but do not propagate by infecting other 
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software) used to mean a variety of forms of 
hostile, intrusive, or annoying software or 
program code (IAIS, 2016).  
It can be classified as crimeware (IAIS, 2016). 
 
files (Gupta, 2013); 
Ransomware - Encryption of files on a computer, and leaving a message that a certain 
ransom must be paid for the decryption key to be disclosed (Gupta, 2013); 
Adware - software that enables displaying banner advertisements when the program 
is running (Gupta, 2013); 
Spyware - programs that collect information about a person or an organization 
without that entity's consent and awareness (Gupta, 2013); 
Scareware - comprises several classes of scam software with malicious payloads, or of 
limited or no benefit, that are sold to consumers via certain unethical marketing 
practices (Gupta, 2013); 
Bot Networks - Bots are programs that infect a system to provide remote command 
and control access via a variety of protocols, such as HTTP, instant messaging, and 
peer-to-peer protocols. Several of bots under common control are commonly referred 
to as a Botnet. Computers get associated with botnets when unaware users download 
malware which is sent as an e-mail attachment. Illicit activities can be carried out with 
bots by the controller that include relays for sending spam and phishing emails, 
updates for existing malware, DDoS, etc. (Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018); 
Pharming - It is also called farming or Domain Name System (DNS) poisoning. In this 
attack whenever a user tries to access a website, he/ she will be redirected to a fake 
site. Pharming can be done in two possible ways: one is by changing host’s files on a 
victim’s computer and other way is by exploiting vulnerability in DNS server software 
(Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018); 
Phishing - An attack in which an attempt is made to obtain user’s sensitive 
information by an attacker pretending to be a reliable body in an electronic 
communication. It is typically carried out by email tricking or instant messaging in 
which users are asked to click on a link usually for securing their accounts. The users 
are then directed to fraudulent websites which look alike the original banking website 
so that the user is deceived and is asked to enter his personal information such as 
usernames, passwords, credit card details, etc. After that the fraudster has access to 
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the customer's online bank account and to the funds contained in that account 
(Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018); 
Rogueware - Consists of any kind of fake software solution that attempts to steal 
money from users by attracting them into paying to remove nonexistent threats 
(Gupta, 2013); 
Vishing - It combines "voice" and ―phishing. Vishing is an illegal practice where an 
attacker calls a user and pretends to be from a bank in which the user has an account. 
He usually asks to verify the user’s account information (stating that user’s account 
has been suspended, etc.) and once the user gives his credentials such as username, 
password, credit card number, etc., the attacker has easy access to the user’s account 
and the money in it (Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018); 
IP spoofing - A technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, whereby 
the intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP address indicating that the 
message is coming from a trusted host (Gupta, 2013).  
Cyber-extortion (IAIS, 2016) It is usually accomplished through a form of 
crimeware known as ransomware in which 
hackers infiltrate computers encrypt the data 
and then demand a payment to decrypt it. 
Certain types of ransomware are very effective, 
and victims of such attacks cannot retrieve data 
without paying ransom unless they have made a 
backup copy of the data stored on media not 
subject to the ransomware attack (IAIS, 2016). 
DDoS  
Ransomware 
Cyber-fraud (Marsh & 
McLENNAN, 2018) 
Illegitimate financial transfer is made as a result 
of a network intrusion or social engineering. 
Fraud is a kind of inappropriate behavior that is 
inherently malicious in nature, and aimed at 




Cyber-squatting - A process in which a famous domain name is registered and then it 
is sold for a fortune. Cyber Squatters register domain names which are like popular 
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systems, applications or information (Marsh & 
McLENNAN, 2018). 
service providers’ domains so as to attract their users and benefit from it (Reddy & 
Bhargavi, 2018); 
SMS Tricking - A user receives a SMS message which appears to be coming from a 
legitimate bank. In this SMS the originating mobile number (Sender ID) is replaced by 
alphanumeric text. Here a user may be fooled to give his/her online credentials and 
his/her money may be at risk of theft (Reddy & Bhargavi, 2018); 
SMS OTP attacks - SMS OTP is widely used as an identification and authentication 
method by many major financial institutions. It is a two-factor authentication method 
in which a password is created and sent by SMS whenever the users attempt 
authentication and the password is disposed of after use. Hackers can easily intercept 
the authentication codes sent by SMS via the mobile network (Reddy & Bhargavi, 
2018). 
Account/identity hi-jacking and 
weak authentication (IRM, 
2014) 
In hijackings, the attacker uses an exploit on a 
device to take over a session between this 
device and a host. It disconnects then the 
device from the communication. The server still 
believes that it is communicating to the original 




Browser hijacker - The most generally accepted description for browser hijacking 
software is external code that changes your Internet Explorer settings (Gupta, 2013); 
Click jacking - is a malicious technique of tricking web users into revealing confidential 
information or taking control of their computer while clicking on apparently 
innocuous web pages (Gupta, 2013); 
Session hijacking - is an attack which is basically used to gain the unauthorized access 
between an authorized session connections. This is usually done to attack the social 
network website and banking websites (Baitha & Vinod, 2018). 
Cross site scripting attacks Attacks against web applications in which an 
attacker gets control of a user’s browser in 
order to execute a malicious script (usually an 
HTML/JavaScript code) within the context of 
trust of web application’s site. The injected 
script can either point the user transparently to 





the user's session and to access to any sensitive 
browser resource associated to the web 
application (e.g., cookies, session IDs, etc.) 
(Garcia-Alfaro & Navarro-Arribas, 2009). 
SQL Injection Attack A code injection technique that exploits security 
vulnerability in some computer software 
(Gupta, 2013). 
 
Systems and technology failures 
(Eling & Wirfs, 2016)  
It covers what is related to hardware, software 
and system failures. 
See more detail on subchapter 4.1.2, table 1.5 Categories and subcategories of cyber 
risk by source classification 
External Events It covers what is related to catastrophes, legal 
issues, business issues and service 
dependencies. 
See more detail on subchapter 4.1.2, table 1.5 Categories and subcategories of cyber 
risk by source classification 
Failed internal processes (Eling 
& Wirfs, 2016) 
Operational IT risks due to poor systems 
integrity or other factors (IRM, 2014) 
See more detail on subchapter 4.1.2, table 1.5 Categories and subcategories of cyber 
risk by source classification 








Annex 8. Risk transfer options 
Risk taker Risk transfer options 
Risk owner (will first install risk control activities such as 
self-protection and self-insurance to reduce its risk 
exposure) 
Private risk pool 
 
Industry-wide risk pool 
Primary Insurer Conventional insurance 
Insurance pool 
Reinsurer Proportional reinsurance 
Non-proportional reinsurance 
Reinsurance pool 
Capital Markets Insurance-linked securities 
Governments/Taxpayer State as primary insurer/ complete coverage 
Reinsurer of Last resort 















Annex 9. Most common first and third-party coverages 
Liabilities source Consequences 
First party loss – direct loss incurred by the insured 
Network interruption Loss of business income due to cyber incident 
Business interruption 
Damage to intangible assets 
Damage to tangible assets (products liability) 
Network interruption Outside Security Provider 
(OSP)  
Loss due to outside provider security or system failure 
Cyber extortion Cost of ransom payment 
Cyber specialist 
Electronic data incident Loss due to accidental damage of computer system 
Cyber theft Financial loss from fraudulent electronic transfer of funds 
Data restoration 
Extra expense 
System clean-up costs 
Administrative investigation and penalties 
Third-party loss - liability coverage/losses to others 
Data protection and cyber liability Liability claims 
Fines 
Media liability  
Wrongful collection of information  
Media content infringement/defamatory content  
Violation of notification obligations  






Annex 10. Means of governmental intervention 
















Primary insurer  
Reinsurer of Last Resort Covers only some specific major risks 
Lender of Last Resort Provide liquidity to (re-)insurers that 






Incentivize the purchase of insurance coverage 
through compulsory insurance, set incentives for 
self-protection/self-insurance through subsidies 
based on security spending or intensify the 






Set up an anonymized data pool Provides a common platform for data 
sharing  
Establish or intensify the reporting obligations  
Improve standards for data protection through new 
laws for data protection 
 





Annex 11. Risk associated to cyber security incidents 




Expropriation of funds and/or assets 
Losses of future revenue 
Security costs of systems and remediation; 
Court costs and/or resolution; 
Fees for non-compliance with contractual obligations and/or possible sanctions. 
Reputational 
Loss of confidence due to recurrence and/or exposure incident media coverage; 
Impact on business areas critical for trust in the sector; 
Image degradation due to non-compliance with regulatory requirements and/or 
possible sanctions; 
Data Disclosure sensitive (i.e. personal) 
Operational 
Disruption of critical functions and/or services essential for the public; 
System incidents, applications and networks and/or security breaches of information; 
Failures in integrating systems and networks outsourcing; 
Activation of business continuity and disaster recovery. 
Legal 
Failure to meet deadlines regulatory financial reports; 
Inability to respond to legal obligations to customers / consumers; 
Non-compliance with regulation AML / CFT; 
Loss of confidentiality and data integrity sensitive (i.e. personal). 
Possibility of occurrence of disputes. 








Annex 12. Questionnaire to Insurance Companies 
QUESTIONS TO INSURANCE COMPANY SOURCE 
A. General information of the company  
1) Origin of the company:  
B. Knowledge of cyber risk  
1) What is the level of understanding about cyber risk? (ENISA, 2016) 
2) In your perspective, what sources of cyber risk are banks most exposed 
to? 
(Cebula and Young, 2010) 
3) In your perspective, what types of cyber risk a bank is most exposed to? (OECD, 2018) 
(Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018) 
4) What will be the business impacts for the banking sector from suffering a 
cyber-attack? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
C. Cyber risk insurance  
1) Does your company sell insurance against cyber risk?  
2) What are the main reasons for not to commercialize an insurance product 
against cyber risk? 
 
3) What type(s) of cyber insurance coverage does the company offer? (EIOPA, 2018) 
(OECD, 2017) 
4) Does your company offer coverage of both 1st party costs and 3rd party 
liabilities? 
(ENISA, 2016) 
5) What loss categories does your company offer coverage? (OECD, 2017) 
(Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018)? 
6) Are there any exclusions regarding some types of cyber risks? (Franke, 2017) 
(Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018) 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
(Biener, Eling, & Wirfs, 2015) 
7) Does your company provide cyber coverage for subsidiaries and corporate 
entities in different jurisdictions? 
(Franke, 2017) 
8) Does your company assess the banks’ exposure to cyber risk? (Franke, 2017) 
9) What are the requisites that a costumer must have in order to be eligible 
to get a cyber risk offer from your company? 
(Franke, 2017) 
10) How does your company assess bank’s exposure to cyber risk? (ENISA, 2012) 
(ENISA, 2016) 
(AIR, 2017) 




12) Does your cyber risk protection offer depends on the assessment that 
you do on your client? 
(Franke, 2017) 
13) Does your cyber insurance offering face certain challenges regarding the 




14) Does your cyber insurance offering require or recommend a particular 
standard or good practice for assessing the risk of a potential client? 
(ENISA, 2016) 
15) Do you offer any additional services with the cyber insurance? (EIOPA, 2018) 
16) Is pricing affected by the technology prevention measures and 
procedures implemented by customers and maturity of customers? 
(Franke, 2017) 
17) In your perspective, what are the main obstacles to selling cyber 
policies? 
(ENISA, 2016) 
(Eling & Wirfs, 2016) 
18) In your perspective, what are the main advantages to the banks to have 
a dedicated cyber insurance policy? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
19) In your perspective, do you think government participation would help 
the development of the insurance market for cyber risk? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
20) In which way?  
D. Perceived market evolution for cyber risk  
1) Has the company been noticing an increase in the demand for cyber 
insurance products in the last 2 years? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
2) How does the company perceive the future perspectives for the cyber 
insurance market?  
(EIOPA, 2018) 
3) Do you expect that GDPR will ultimately increase awareness of cyber risk 
and stimulate demand for cyber insurance? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
4) In your opinion, are there any obstacles in the current supervisory 
framework that could ultimately restrain the growth of the cyber insurance 
market? 
(ESA, 2019) 
5) In your opinion, what are the biggest controls to improve the insurability 
of cyber risk? 














Annex 13. Questionnaire to ASF 
QUESTIONS TO INSURANCE COMPANY 
1. How does the Supervision Authority perceive the evolution of cyber insurance market in Portugal? 
2. What are the main challenges for an insurance company to secure this cyber risk? 
3. Do you think that banking institutions operating in Portugal are properly prepared against cyber risk? 
4. Do you expect that GDPR will ultimately increase awareness of cyber risk and stimulate demand for cyber 
insurance?  Why? 
5. In ASF point of view, what are the biggest controls to improve the insurability of cyber risk? (choose the best 
three options)  
a. Develop regulatory requirements (e.g., a global standard for cyber risk assessment and mitigation; 
intensification of penalties)  
b. Develop platforms to increase data availability/exchange for cyber risk incidents  
c. Develop innovative ways to manage cyber risks  
d. Develop insurance products and (re)insurance markets to cover cyber risks  
e. Develop public and/or private cyber insurance pools (i.e., a collaboration between primary insurers (and 
reinsurers) to create a wider actuarial foundation for particularly high and unbalanced risks) 
f. Implementation of reporting obligations for cyber risk incidents  
g. Promote the introduction of capital market solutions for cyber risk  















Annex 14. Questionnaire to Banks 
QUESTIONS TO BANKS SOURCE 
A. General information of the company  
1) Origin of the company:  
2) Number of employees and annual turnover: (Comissão Europeia, 2003) 
B. Knowledge of cyber risk  
1) What is the level of understanding about cyber risk? (ENISA, 2016) 
2) What are the company biggest exposures? (IRM, 2014) 
3) What are the main sources of cyber risk that the bank is exposed to? (Cebula and Young, 2010) 
4) What are the main types of cyber risk that the bank is most exposed to? (OECD, 2018) 
(Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018) 
5) What will be the business impacts for the bank from suffering a cyber-
attack? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
C. Cyber Attack History in the Enterprise  
1) Has the bank ever suffered a cyber-attack?  
1.1) What were the sources of that attack? (Cebula and Young, 2010) 
1.2) What were the types of cyber risk of that attack? (OECD, 2018) 
(Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018) 
2) Have your partners or outsourcing companies already suffered any 
cyber-attacks that have affected the bank? 
 
D. Cyber Insurance protection  
1) How do you manage cyber risk?  
1.1) Mitigation techniques (EBA, 2018) 
1.2) Transferring options (Eling & Wirfs, 2016) 
1.3) Other. Which?  
E. Cyber risk Insurance  
1) Does your company have cyber risk insurance?  
2) What type(s) of cyber insurance coverage does the bank purchase? (OECD, 2017)  
(EIOPA, 2018) 
3) Does the company already seek for insurance coverage for cyber risk?  
4) What are the reasons why the company doesn’t have insurance against 
cyber risk? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
If you select option d) (perception that the company is already protected 
against cyber-risks), indicate these forms of protection: 
(Eling & Wirfs, 2016) 
5) Does your cyber insurance covers both 1st party costs and 3rd party 
liabilities? 
(ENISA, 2016) 
6) What loss categories are included in your policy? (OECD, 2017) 
(Marsh & McLENNAN, 2018) 
7) When you made your insurance, contract was there any kind of cyber 
risk that the company considered important, and which the insurer did not 
cover? 
 









9) Did the insurer apply some reduction to the premium due to the risk 
assessment findings? 
 
10) Does the company purchase any consulting, cyber risk assessment or 
incident response services from the insurance company? 
(ENISA, 2016) 









12) What are the main advantages to the company to have a dedicated 
cyber insurance policy? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
 
13) How satisfied is the company with its cyber insurance product?  
14) Does the company follow any security management standards like 
ISO27001? 
(ENISA, 2016) 
F. Perceived market evolution for cyber risk  
1) How does the company perceive the future perspectives for the cyber 
insurance market? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
2) Do you expect that GDPR will ultimately increase awareness of cyber risk 
and stimulate demand for cyber insurance? 
(EIOPA, 2018) 
3) In your opinion, what are the biggest controls to improve the insurability 
of cyber risk? 















Annex 15. Glossary 
Term Definition 
Cloud It is well known as cloud computing and it is the delivery of different services through the 
Internet. These resources include tools and applications like data storage, servers, databases, 
networking, and software. 
Crimeware It is any computer program designed for the express purpose of conducting malicious and 
illegal activities online. Although adware, spyware and malware can all be used to conduct 
illegal activity, crimeware refers to programs that are meant to automate the theft of 
information, allowing the thief to gain access to a person’s financial accounts online. 
Cybersecurity The term refers to strategies, policies, and standards encompassing the full range of threat 
reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, 
resilience, and recovery activities, and policies regarding the security of an insurer’s 
operations 
Cyberspace A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent 
network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers 
Cyber-attack Includes a wide range of technical and social methods to pursue an ultimate goal – the 
propagation, extraction, denial or manipulation of information. Attempts to damage, disrupt, 
or gain unauthorized access to a computer, computer system, or electronic communications 
network. 
Cybercrime Includes a wide swath of activities that affect both the individual citizen directly (e.g. identity 
theft) and corporations (e.g. the theft of intellectual property) 
Cyber extortion Usually accomplished through a form of crimeware known as ransomware in which hackers 
infiltrate computers belonging to a business or an individual, encrypt the data thereon, and 
then demand a payment to decrypt it. 
Cyber hygiene It is defined “as a means to appropriately protect and maintain IT systems and devices and 
implement cybersecurity best practices”. To be effective these measures of prevention, 
detection and action need to be attainable, accreditable and affordable 
Cyber incident Actions taken through the use of computer networks that result in an actual or potentially 
adverse effect on an information system or the information residing therein. 
Cyber 
insurance 




The ability to anticipate, withstand, contain and rapidly recover from a cyber-attack 
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Cyber risk Cyber risk is commonly defined as exposure to harm or loss resulting from breaches of or 
attacks on information systems. However, this definition must be broadened. A better, more 
encompassing definition is “the potential of loss or harm related to technical infrastructure or 
the use of technology within an organization.” 
Cyber threat A circumstance or event with the potential to intentionally or unintentionally exploit one or 
more system vulnerabilities resulting in a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
Data Breach It is an incident that involves the unauthorized or illegal viewing, access or retrieval of data by 
an individual, application or service. It is a type of security breach specifically designed to steal 
and/or publish data to an unsecured or illegal location. A data breach is also known as a data 
spill or data leak. 
Hacker A hacker is an individual who uses computer, networking or other skills to overcome a 
technical problem. The term hacker may refer to anyone with technical skills, but it often 
refers to a person who uses his or her abilities to gain unauthorized access to systems or 
networks in order to commit crimes 
Emerging risk Risks that are known to some degree but are not likely to materialize or have an impact for 
several years. Another characteristic of an emerging risk is that it can be very difficult to 
quantify as it can have far reaching impacts on industry and society overall. 
Exclusion Those risks excluded from an insurance policy 
Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act 
It is a United States federal law that requires financial institutions to explain how they share 
and protect their customers’ private information. 
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act is an act created by The United States 
Government in an effort to protect individuals covered by health insurance and to set 
standards for the storage and privacy of personal medical data. 
HITECH The HITECH Act was created to motivate the implementation of electronic health records 
(EHR) and supporting technology in the United States.  The Act expanded the scope of privacy 
and security protections available under HIPAA compliance by increasing the potential legal 
liability for non-compliance and it providing for more stringent enforcement. 
Information 
Technology 
Information technology (IT) refers to the development, maintenance, and use of computer 




It is the document defining what risks or perils are insured along with exclusions 
Insurer The party providing an insurance product 
Insured The party having taken out or likely to acquire or renew an insurance product 





Liability The state of being legally obliged and responsible under the terms of a policy  
Network It is a group of two or more devices that can communicate. In practice, a network is 
comprised of a number of different computer systems connected by physical and/or wireless 
connections. 
PCI-DSS It is a set of security standards designed to ensure that all companies that accept, process, 
store or transmit credit card information maintain a secure environment. 
Premium The fee paid by the insured to the insurer for assuming the risk 
Self-insurance Reduction in the size of a loss (the insured covering the costs of a loss itself 
Self-protection Measures taken by the insured to reduce the probability of a loss 
Server It Is a computer, a device or a program that is dedicated to managing network resources. 
Systemic risk It is the possibility that an event at the company level could trigger severe instability or 
collapse an entire industry or economy. 
Ransom It is a sum of money demanded in exchange for someone or something that has been taken. 
Ransomware Ransomware is a type of malware program that infects, locks or takes control of a system and 
demands ransom to undo it. Ransomware attacks and infects a computer with the intention 
of extorting money from its owner. 
Risk 
aggregation 
Defined as the process of defining, gathering and processing risk data. 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act set standards related to data protection, applying to US public companies 
and accounting firms. 
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